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ABSTRACT
Comprehensive case studies on malicious code mostly focus on
botnets and worms (recently revived with IoT devices), prominent
pieces of malware or Advanced Persistent Threats, exploit kits,
and ransomware. However, adware seldom receives such attention.
Previous studies on “unwanted” Windows applications, including
adware, favored breadth of analysis, uncovering ties between differ-
ent actors and distribution methods. In this paper, we demonstrate
the capabilities, privacy and security risks, and prevalence of a par-
ticularly successful and active adware business:Wajam, by tracking
its evolution over nearly six years. We first study its multi-layer
antivirus evasion capabilities, a combination of known and newly
adapted techniques, that ensure low detection rates of its daily
variants, along with prominent features, e.g., traffic interception
and browser process injection. Then, we look at the privacy and
security implications for infected users, including plaintext leaks of
browser histories and keyword searches on highly popular websites,
along with arbitrary content injection on HTTPS webpages and
remote code execution vulnerabilities. Finally, we study Wajam’s
prevalence through the popularity of its domains. Once considered
as seriously as spyware, adware is now merely called “not-a-virus”,
“optional” or “unwanted” although its negative impact is growing.
We emphasize that the adware problem has been overlooked for too
long, which can reach (or even surplus) the complexity and impact
of regular malware, and pose both privacy and security risks to
users, more so than many well-known and thoroughly-analyzed
malware families.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The business of generating revenue through ads can be very in-
trusive for end users. Popular application download websites are
known to bundle adware with their custom installers [26, 29]. Users
can also be misled to install Potentially Unwanted Programs/Ap-
plications (PUP/PUA) that provide limited or deceptive services
(e.g., toolbars, cleanup utilities) along with invasive ads [58, 75]. The
prevalence of adware is also increasing. Recent studies [36, 75] show
that Google Safe Browsing triggers 60 million warnings per week
for bundled installers, twice the rate of malware-related warnings.
However, adware applications are generally not considered as
much of a threat as malware—apparent from some antivirus labels,
e.g., “not-a-virus”, “Unwanted-Program”, “PUP.Optional”, which
may not even trigger an alert [24, 34]. After all, displaying ads is not
considered a malicious activity, and users even provide some form
of “consent” to install these unwanted bundled applications [75].
However, prior to 2006, adware was also labeled as “spyware” [18],
due to its privacy-invasive nature. Since then, several lawsuits suc-
ceeded in downgrading the terms used by AV companies to adware,
then to PUP/PUA [46, 58]. Consequently, adware has received less
scrutiny from the malware research community in the past decade
or so. Indeed, studies on PUPs tend to focus mostly on the rev-
enues, distribution and relationships between actors [36, 74, 75],
and the abuse of code signing certificates by PUPs to reduce sus-
picion [37]. Recent industry reports are now only focused on more
trendy threats, e.g., ransomware, supply chain attacks [70].
Malware analysis has a long history in the academia—starting
from the Morris Worm report from 1989 [66]. Past malware case
studies focused on regular botnets [68], IoT botnets [8], prominent
malware [12, 60], web exploit kits [33, 42], Advanced Persistent
Threats [44, 69], and ransomware [35]. Results of these analyses
sometimes lead to the identification, and even prosecution of sev-
eral malware authors [16, 28], and in some reduction of exploit kits
(at least temporarily, see, e.g., [67]). However, adware campaigns
remain unscathed. Previous cases of ad-related products received
media attention as they severely downgrade HTTPS security [1, 2],
but they generally do not adopt techniques from malware (e.g.,
obfuscation and evasion). Therefore, security companies may pri-
oritize their effort on malware, while academic researchers may
consider adware as a non-problem, or simply a technically un-
interesting one, enabling adware to survive and thrive for long.
Important questions remain unexplored about adware, including:
1) Are they all simply displaying untargeted advertisements? 2)
Do they pose any serious security and privacy threats? 3) Are all
strains limited in complexity and reliably detected by AVs?
On mobile platforms, applications are limited in their ability
to display ads and steal information. For instance, an app cannot
display ads within another app, or systematically intercept network
traffic without adequate permissions and direct user consent. Apps
found misbehaving are evicted from app markets, limiting their
impact. Unfortunately, there are no such systematic equivalent on
desktop platforms (except Windows 10 S mode), and users must
bear the consequences of agreeing to fine print terms of services,
which may include the installation of numerous bundled unwanted
commercial pay-per-install applications [75].
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We explore the case of Wajam, a seven-year old advertisement-
supported social search engine that progressively turned into so-
phisticated deceptive adware and spyware, originally developed
by a Canadian company and later sold to China. We initially ob-
served TLS certificates from some user machines with seemingly
random issuer names, e.g., b02669b9042c6a8f. Some of those indi-
cated an email address that led us to Wajam, and we collected 52
samples dated from 2013 to 2018. Historical samples are challeng-
ing to obtain, since Wajam is often dynamically downloaded by
other software installers, and relies either on generic or randomized
filenames and root certificates, limiting the number of searchable
fingerprints.
Wajam probably would not subsist for seven years without af-
fecting many users, and in turn generating enough revenue. To
this end, we tracked 332 domain names used by Wajam, as found
e.g., in code signing certificates, and hardcoded URLs in samples,
and followed the evolution of these domains in top domain lists.
In the past two years, we found ranks as high as the top 29,427
in Umbrella’s list of top queried domains [20]. Combined together
using the Dowdall rule (cf. [40]), these domains could rank up to
the top 5,246. Wajam’s domains are queried when ads are injected
into webpages and while pulling updates, suggesting that a substan-
tial number of users remain continuously infected. Indeed, during
an investigation by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC)
of Canada in 2016 [49], the company behind Wajam reported to
OPC that it had made “hundreds of millions of installations” and
collected “approximately 400 terabytes” of personal information.
We study the technical evolution of content injection, and iden-
tify four major generations, including browser add-on, proxy set-
tings changer, browser process injector, and system-wide traffic
interceptor. Browser process injection involves hooking into a
browser to modify the traffic after it is decrypted and before it
is rendered, enabling man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks. Such
attacks are new in the adware realm—known to be last used by the
Zeus malware for stealing banking information [6, 31].
Across generations, Wajam increasingly makes use of several
anti-analysis and evasion techniques including: a) daily release of
metamorphic variants, b) steganography, c) string and library call
obfuscation, d) encrypted strings and files, e) deep and diversified
junk code, f) polymorphic resources, g) valid digital signatures, h)
randomized filenames and root certificate Common Names, i) and
encrypted updates. Wajam also implements anti-detection features
ranging from disabling Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool
(MRT), self-excluding its installation paths fromWindows Defender,
and sometimes leveraging rootkit capabilities to hide its installation
folder from users. We detail 23 such techniques, which are still
effective as of Apr. 2019 to prevent most AVs to even flag fresh daily
samples. For example, the sample from Apr. 29 is flagged only by 4
AVs out of 71, three of them label it with “heuristic”, “suspicious” and
“Trojan.Generic,” suggesting that they merely detect some oddities.
We also found security flaws that have exposed (possibly) mil-
lions of users for the last four years and counting to potential arbi-
trary content injection, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, and re-
mote code execution (RCE). MITM attacks could make long-lasting
effects by changing Wajam’s update URL to an attack server. As the
third generation of Wajam leverages browser process injection, con-
tent can be injected in the webpage without its HTTPS certificate
being changed, preventing even a mindful user from detecting the
tampering. In addition, Wajam systematically downgrades the secu-
rity of a number of high-profile websites by removing their Content
Security Policy, e.g., facebook.com, and other security-related HTTP
headers from the server’s response. Further, Wajam sends—in plain-
text—the browsing histories from four major browsers (if installed),
and the list of installed programs, to Wajam’s operators. Finally,
search keywords input on 100 groups of domains spanning mil-
lions of websites are also leaked. Hence, Wajam remains as a major
privacy and security threat to millions of users.
While the existence of traffic-injecting malware is known [6, 31],
and TLS flaws are reminiscent of Superfish and Privdog [1, 2], Wa-
jam is unique in its sophistication, and has a broader impact. Its
anti-analysis techniques became more advanced and innovative
over time—posing as a significant barrier to study it. We also dis-
covered a separate piece of adware, OtherSearch, which reuses the
same model and similar techniques as Wajam. This indicates the
existence of a common third-party obfuscation framework provider,
which perhaps serve other malware/adware businesses. We focus
on Wajam only due to the abundance of samples we could collect.
Considering Wajam’s complexity and automation of evasion tech-
niques, we argue that adware mandates more serious analysis effort.
Contributions.
(1) We collect and reverse-engineer 52 unique samples of Wa-
jam spanning across six years and identify four content injec-
tion techniques, one of which was previously used in a well-
known banking trojan. This analysis is a significant reverse-
engineering effort to characterize the technical and design
evolution of a successful ad injector. We investigate the chrono-
logical evolution for such an application over the years, shed-
ding light on the practices, history and techniques used by such
software. Our analysis may help advance reverse engineering
of other malware as well.
(2) We uncover the serious level of complexity used in Wajam
across generations. These 52 samples used various combina-
tions of 23 effective anti-analysis and evasion techniques, and
even rootkit-like features, which are even rarely found in a
single piece of prominent malware. Such adware samples are
generally much less analyzed than malware. Our revelations
call for more concentrated reverse engineering efforts towards
adware, and more generally, on PUPs.
(3) We track 332 domains used by Wajam to serve injected scripts
and updates, and leverage the Umbrella top 1M domain list
to estimate Wajam’s prevalence over the last two years; we
estimate that if Wajam used a single domain, it would rank
5,246th.We also query domains known to be targeted byWajam
through 5M peers from a residential proxy network and find
infected peers in 35 countries between 2017 and 2019.
(4) We also highlight serious private information leakage and se-
curity risks (e.g., enabling MITM with long-lasting effect and
possibly RCE attacks) to users affected by Wajam. As new vari-
ants remain largely undetected by malware engines during the
first days, users even with up-to-date AV/OS remain vulnerable.
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2 WAJAM’S HISTORY
Wajam Internet Technologies Inc. was originally headquartered in
Montreal, Canada [52]. Their product (Wajam) aimed at enhanc-
ing the search results of a number of websites (e.g., Google, Yahoo,
Ask.com, Expedia, Wikipedia, Youtube) with content extracted from
a user’s social media connections (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn).
Wajamwas first released in Oct. 2011, rebranded as Social2Search in
May 2016 [49], then as SearchAwesome in Aug. 2017 (as we found).
We use the name Wajam interchangeably to refer to the company
or the software they developed. To gain revenue, Wajam injects ads
into browser traffic [64]. The company progressively lost its con-
nection with social media and became purely ad/spyware in 2017.
The OPC Canada investigated the company between Oct. 2016
and July 2017 [49]. OPC found numerous violations of Canadian
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA), relative to the egregious collection and preservation of
personal data (“approximately 400 terabytes” by the company’s own
admission), and problematic user consent/EULA, installation/unin-
stallation methods. OPC issued a list of 14 corrective measures. In-
stead, Wajam sold its activities to a newly created company called
Iron Mountain Technology Limited (IMTL) in Hong-Kong, and
therefore declared itself unaccountable to Canadian regulations.
IMTL seems to have continued Wajam’s operations uninterrupted
since then and continued to develop its capabilities towards ad
injection and AV evasion. We refer the readers interested in the
discussion relative to the EULA and user consent to the OPC report.
3 RELATEDWORK
Previous studies on worms and botnets mostly focused on the
network aspect of such threats, instead of particular software com-
plexity or advanced obfuscation techniques; see e.g., Conficker [60],
Torpig [68] and Mirai [8]. While the largest known botnet reached
up to an estimated 50 million users [73], it is still an order of mag-
nitude lower than the total distribution of Wajam.
The Mirai botnet was studied across a thousand samples [8].
Authors tracked forks of the original malware, and analyzed the
newly added features, including e.g., self-deleting binary, more
hardcoded passwords to infect devices—all these changes are largely
straightforward. Moreover, Mirai’s source code was leaked and
readily available. In contrast, we reverse-engineer Wajam from
scratch to understand the full extent of its capabilities, and bridge
significant gaps across generations and major updates, including
dealing with e.g., steganography-based installers, custom packers
and multiple encryption layers.
The Zeus banking malware [31], a prominent strain reaching
3.6 million infections, shares some traits with Wajam, including en-
crypted code sections (albeit done differently), dynamic library load-
ing, encrypted payloads (for configuration files only) with XOR or
RC4 hardcoded keys. Zeus also performed MITB by injecting a DLL
in browser processes, similar to Wajam’s 3rd generation. However,
Zeus source code became public in 2016, helping its analysis. Also,
active variants of Zeus [10] no longer perform browser injection,
in contrast to Wajam’s well-maintained browser process injection.
Targeted Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are known for the
extent of their operations, both in duration and complexity, e.g. [44,
69]. In contrast, our focus is an adware application, which is not
expected to use APT-related techniques e.g., 0-day vulnerabilities.
Nevertheless, we found thatWajam leverages effective antivirus eva-
sion techniques, and significantly hinders reverse-engineering, over
several years. These behaviors are rare even in regular malware.
Adware can serve as a cover-up for hiding an APT, as it may slip
through the hands of an analyst [72]. This behavior is coined as
Advanced Persistent Adware [15].
Similar to adware, ransomware is also heavily motivated by
monetary gains. Kharraz et al. [35] analyzed 1,359 ransomware
samples and reported insights into their encryption modules, file
replacement and deletion mechanisms. Web exploit kits have also
been analyzed [33, 42], including PHP and JavaScript components.
The level of sophistication in both cases was limited.
Wajam has been cited in broad analyses covering the distribu-
tion models of pay-per-install PUPs [36, 75]; however, only little
information about Wajam itself is revealed, including an estimated
user base (in the order of 107 during the period Jan. 2013–July 2014,
much less than the total number of infections reported in the or-
der of 108 by its operators in 2017 [49]), and general features (e.g.,
Wajam is a browser-addon—incorrect since the end of 2014).
In a 2005 report [18], Symantec shows that adware and spy-
ware (without any distinction) exfiltrate sensitive and personally-
identifiable data, e.g., extensive system information, names, credit
card numbers, username and passwords, or even entire webpages.
The use of rootkit techniques, code injection, and random filenames
are also discussed. We not only show that these behaviors are still
topical, but we also point at larger security implications resulting
from MITM and RCE vulnerabilities, likely due to the lack of in-
centives from the adware vendor to ship secure code, and from
researchers to study and report flaws to such vendors. Privacy
leakages such as browsing histories are also certainly more severe
today than they were 14 years ago. In addition, the Internet popu-
lation, and thus the potential number of victims, has seen a 4-fold
increase during this period [30]. Apparently, AV companies used
to treat adware more seriously in the past, as evident from the lack
of comprehensive reports on recent adware.
The NetFilter/ProtocolFilters SDKs [61] were used in PrivDog [2],
which was vulnerable to MITM attacks, as it did not use the cer-
tificate validation capabilities of the SDK. Böck [14] extracted the
hardcoded private keys from ProtocolFilters found in AdGuard and
PrivDog, and listed PUPs that may rely on this library (did not
include Wajam). While PrivDog received significant attention, only
one version of the product was vulnerable, affecting 57k users [2].
The MarketScore spyware also proxied HTTPS traffic [18]; how-
ever, encrypted traffic was marginal in 2005. In contrast, Wajam
has exposed millions of users to similar MITM attacks for about
four years. Compared to Superfish, installed by default on certain
Lenovo laptops, Wajam is not bound to a specific hardware vendor.
Variousmalicious obfuscation techniques have been documented,
including: encrypted code section [76], encrypted strings and down-
loaded configuration files [13], junk code [57], polymorphic icons
in Winwebsec, SecurityShield and zbot [47], inflated executable file
size in the XXMM toolkit [32], rootkit as found in the Komodia
traffic interception SDK [21], the use of NSIS installers with de-
cryption DLLs in Cerber, Gamarue, Kovter and ZCrypt [19], hiding
encrypted payloads in BMP [11] and PNG files [45]. Wajam com-
bines all these techniques from the malware realm, and enhances
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and layers them. Notably, Wajam’s junk code introduces thousands
of seemingly purposeful functions interconnected in a dense call
graph where the real program functions are hidden. Also, the use of
steganography is diversified to various file formats, and is combined
with layers of obfuscated encryption and compression in samples
from 2018, making Wajam variants highly metamorphic.
4 SAMPLE COLLECTION AND OVERVIEW
We detail below our collection of 52 samples, and summarize their
capabilities; for their notable features (e.g., the use of code-signing,
stealthy installation), see Table 4 (Appendix).
4.1 Sample collection
We obtained our first sample with a known URL to wajam.com
through the Internet Archive as it is no longer available on the
official website. This sample dates back from Dec. 2014, and appears
to be a relatively early version of the product. We obtained 10
more samples from an old malware database [43] by searching for
“Wajam”, two of which were only partial components (DLLs), which
we discarded. After analyzing a few samples, we learned about
URLs fetched by the application, leading us to query keywords from
another malware database [22]. We also learned the URLs serving
variants of the installer, and downloaded a sample per month in
2018. At the end of this iterative process, we collected 48 standalone
installers, two online installers, and two update packages.
The variants we fetched directly from Wajam servers are named
Setup.exe; however, when submitting these samples to VirusTo-
tal, they are sometimes already known by other filenames, e.g.,
update.exe. We could not find obvious paths that include such
filenames on known Wajam servers, suggesting that Wajam is also
hosted elsewhere, or downloaded through different vectors. As
most of the samples are digitally signed and timestamped, or install
a signed component, we could trace the history of Wajam over five
and a half years, from Jan. 2013 to July 2018.
4.2 Categories
We identified four injection techniques that were used mostly
chronologically. Hence, we refer to each group as a generation; see
Table 1 for the distribution of samples among generations. We refer
to a given sample by its generation letter followed by its chronologi-
cal index within its generation, e.g., C18. We keep a numerical refer-
ence when referring to an entire generation, e.g., third generation.
Generation A: Browser add-on. The two oldest samples (Jan.
2013 and 2014) install add-ons to Chrome, Firefox and IE. There
was a Safari add-on as well according to the “Uninstall” page on
wajam.com. A Chrome ad
d-on remains available as of Apr. 2019, but with only 25 users.
These add-ons were used to directly modify the content of selected
websites to insert ads and social-media content in search pages. In
samples A1–2, the injection engine, Priam, receives search queries
and bookmark events.
Generation B: FiddlerCore. Samples from Sept. 2014 to Jan. 2016
have their own interception component and leverage the Fiddler-
Core library [51] to proxy browser traffic. Each detected browser
has its proxy settings set to localhost with a port on which Wajam
is listening. HTTPS traffic is broken at the proxy, which certifies
Table 1: Distribution of samples among generations
Gen. Period covered # samples Injection technique
A 2013-01 – 2014-07 4 Browser add-on
B 2014-09 – 2016-01 6 FiddlerCore
C 2014-10 – 2017-03 19 Browser process injection
D 2016-01 – 2018-07 23 NetFilter+ProtocolFilters
the connection by a certificate issued on-the-fly, and signed by a
root certificate inserted into the Windows and Firefox trust stores.
Only selected domains are intercepted. The application is installed
in the Program Files folder with a meaningful name; however, core
files have long random names. Since no component strictly requires
a signature by the OS, some samples do not bear any signature. We
rely either on a signature on the installer (as seen prior to 2015),
or the timestamp of the latest modified file installed (from 2015) to
establish a release date for those samples.
Generation C: Browser process injection. Installers dated be-
tween Oct. 2014 to May 2016 and two update packages up to Mar.
2017 inject a DLL into IE, Firefox and Chrome. In turn, the DLL
hooks specific functions to modify page contents after they are
fetched from the network (and decrypted in the case of HTTPS traf-
fic), but before they are rendered. Consequently, the injected traffic
in encrypted pages is displayed while the browser shows the origi-
nal server certificate, making this generation more stealthy (cf. [31,
38, 63]).We tested the latest versions of IE/Firefox/Chrome on an up-
to-date Windows 7 32-bit and confirmed that the injection method
is still fully functional.We later found that browser hooking parame-
ters are actively maintained and kept updated hourly (Section 11.3).
Generation D: NetFilter SDK+ProtocolFilters. Starting from
Apr. 2016, a fourth generation implements a NetFilter-based injec-
tion technique. Installers dated after May 2016 install a program
called Social2Search instead of Wajam. Furthermore, samples dated
from Aug. 2017 (i.e., few months after the company was sold to
IMTL) are again rebranded as SearchAwesome. The NetFilter SDK
enables traffic interception, combined with ProtocolFilters that pro-
vides APIs for tampering with the traffic at the application layer.
Instead of explicitly configuring browser proxy settings, NetFilter
installs a network driver that intercepts all the network traffic irre-
spective of the application. In this generation, all HTTPS traffic is
intercepted and all TLS connections are broken at the proxy, except
for the traffic originating from blacklisted process names.
5 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Test environment and sample execution.We leverage VMware
Workstation (WS) and an up-to-date installation of Windows 7 Pro
32-bit with IE 11 and Firefox 61 to capture Wajam’s installation
process. For each sample, we instrument WS to start from a fresh
VM snapshot, transfer the sample on the guest’s desktop, start
Process Monitor [3] to capture I/O activities, and start Wireshark
on the host OS to record the network traffic.We also take a snapshot
of the filesystem and registry before and after the sample is installed
to detect modifications made on the system.
We run the sample with UAC disabled to avoid answering the
prompt, and complete the installation, which usually requires click-
ing only one button at most. It could be possible to instrument the UI
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to fully automate the process; however, wewanted to verifywhether
the sample installs without asking for user consent, opens a web-
page at the end of the setup, or if the process is completely stealthy.
We note that the UAC prompt is not a significant barrier for Wajam,
as it is found bundled (statically or downloaded at runtime) with
other installers, for which users already provided admin privileges.
We could have used existing malware analysis sandboxes; how-
ever, a local deployment would have been required as we need con-
trol over certain registry keys (e.g., Machine GUID). Furthermore,
for consistency and ease of debugging, we used the same environ-
ment to capture runtime behaviors and selectively debug samples.
We also verify the functionality of selected samples on Windows
8.1 Pro 64-bit—some samples lead to a denial of service for certain
websites. To fully understand their functionalities, we also conduct
a more thorough analysis on selected samples from each generation,
by debugging the application and performing MITM attacks.
Studying NSIS installers. Wajam is always based on Nullsoft
Scriptable Install System (NSIS [71]), a popular open-source genera-
tor of Windows installers [65]. NSIS uses LZMA as a preferred com-
pression algorithm and as such, 7-Zip can extract packed files from
NSIS-generated installers, unless a modified NSIS is used [48]. We
used 7-Zip for unpacking when possible. NSIS also compiles an in-
staller based on a configurable installation script written in its own
language. Several NSIS-specific decompilers used to reconstruct the
script from installers but trivial modifications in the source code
could thwart such automated tools. 7-Zip stopped supporting the
decompilation of installer scripts in version 15.06 (Aug. 2015) [5].
We use version 15.05 to successfully decompile these scripts.
Labeling OpenSSL functions. ProtocolFilters is statically linked
with OpenSSL, as indicated by hardcoded strings (e.g., “RSA part
of OpenSSL 1.0.2h 3 May 2016”). However, IDA FLIRT fails to fin-
gerprint OpenSSL-related functions, even with the help of extra
signatures. Given the identified version number, we are able to
label essential functions that call ERR_put_error(). Indeed, such
calls specify the source file path and line number where an error is
thrown, which uniquely identifies a function. By investigating the
use of several such functions, we can identify critical sections, e.g.,
root certificate generation (as used in Section 10).
Debugging.We leverage IDA Pro and x64dbg [78] to debug all bi-
naries to understand some of their anti-analysis techniques. Due to
the extensive use of junk code, identifying meaningful instructions
is challenging. In particular, when reverse-engineering encrypted
payloads, we first set breakpoints on relevant Windows API calls to
load files (e.g., CreateFile, ReadFile, WriteFile, LoadLibrary),
then follow modifications and copies of buffers of interests by set-
ting memory breakpoints on them. We also rely on interesting
network I/O events as seen in Process Monitor to identify relevant
functions from the call stack at that time.
To understand the high-level behavior of decryption routines,
we combine static analysis and step-by-step debugging. We also
leverage Hex-Rays to study the decompiled code, unless Hex-Rays
fails due to obfuscation. Static analysis is also often made difficult
by many dynamic calls resolving only at runtime.
Scope.We focus on reverse-engineering steps that lead to visible
consequences on the system and network activities, and document
the challenges in doing so. This way, we discover a number of
information leaks and several mechanisms to hinder static analysis
and evade early antivirus detection. However, we do not claim that
we found all such techniques nor that we understand all features of
Wajam. Since we do not look at all samples ever released, it is also
likely that we missed intermittent features, making our findings a
lower bound on Wajam’s full potential.
Reproducibility. Since most of this work is a manual effort, we
will release intermediate artifacts in an effort to enable reproduc-
tion, including: the samples, network traces, file-system and registry
modifications during installation, procmon logs, payload decryp-
tion scripts, and VT scan logs. The samples include the 52 reverse-
engineered ones, the 36 more recent samples scanned with VT, and
subsequent samples we kept collecting.
6 TECHNICAL EVOLUTION SUMMARY
We summarize below the inner workings of Wajam and track its
changes made over the years—mostly targeted at improving stealth-
iness and increasing private information leaks.We also demonstrate
the efficacy of its evasion techniques by collecting hourly AV de-
tection rates on 36 samples fetched between Aug. to Nov. 2018.
Wajammodules.Wajam is composed of several modules, some of
which are generation-specific. Its installer is the first executable an
AV gets to analyze, justifying a certain level of obfuscation that con-
stantly increased over time. The installer runs a payload (brh.dll,
called BRH hereafter) to retrieve system and browser information,
e.g., browsing histories, which is then leaked. The installed binaries
comprise the main application, an updater, a browser hooker called
“goblin” in the 3rd generation, and a persistence module.
Typical installation workflow. A typical sample from 2018 is
an NSIS installer with a random icon that unpacks DLLs, which
then locate, deobfuscate, decrypt and uncompress a second-stage
installer from a media file. In turn, this second installer executes
a long obfuscated NSIS script that first calls an unpacked DLL to
decrypt and load its BRH companion to perform a number of leaks.
Then, it installs the main obfuscated Wajam files under Program
Files with random file and folder names. It also adds a persistence
module in the Windows directory along with the generated TLS
certificate in an ‘SSL’ subdirectory, and a signed network driver
(in the System32\drivers folder). The installer creates three Win-
dows services: 1) the network driver, 2) the main application, 3) the
persistence module; and a scheduled task to start the second service
at boot time if not already started. The main application starts by
reading the encrypted updater module, decrypting and executing
it. In turn, the module reads the encrypted injection rules, updates
them and fetches program updates.
Evolution of features.We provide a timeline with evolution mile-
stones regarding the anti-analysis and evasion techniques, privacy
leaks (more in Section 9), and new prominent features, in Figure 1.
The timeline also shows the release time of the samples we analyze,
labeled on the left when space permits. Techniques are numbered
and further discussed in Section 9. This evolution illustrates the un-
derlying design ofWajam over the years. In particular, most changes
relate to improving the anti-analysis and evasion techniques and
could not have been implemented over years had Wajam been
stopped by better AV detection. Also, between 2014 and early 2017,
six types of information leaks were implemented. For each new
5
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2014 Leaks list of installed programs
Inserts root cert. into Firefox trust store
Encrypted strings (T13), dynamic API calls (T14), disables Firefox
SPDY , encrypted URL injection rules (T4), Chrome injection
Leaks browsing and download histories, encrypted browser
hooker DLL (T4), sends list of installed AVs, Opera injection
Random executable filenames (T19), .NET obfuscation
Nested installer (T3), Chromium-based browsers injection
Encrypted nested installer (T4)
Rootkit (T20), leaks list of browser add-ons/extensions
Random installer folder name (T19)
Encrypted injection updates (T4), random root certificate issuer
CN (T19)
Persistence module (T21)
Inflated executables (T12)
Whitelist itself in Windows Defender (T10), leaks presence of
hypervisor, encrypted code section (T16), anti-IDA measures
(T17)
Leaks hypervisor/motherboard vendor
Installers no longer signed (T23)
Random icons (T2), XOR-encrypted updater DLL (T4)
Disables monthly MRT scans and reports (T11)
Steganography to hide nested installer (T5), encrypted browser
info leaking DLL (T4), string literals from English texts as argu-
ments to functions (T18)
RC4-encrypted updater (T4)
Nested installer under further layers of encryption (T4), custom
compression algorithms info leaking DLL (T6), obfuscated key
reconstruction (T7)
Sets Firefox settings to rely on OS trust store and no longer inserts a
root certificate into Firefox trust store, some updates over HTTPS
Some leaks are sent over HTTPS
2015
2016
2017
2018
A3
A4
B1
C1
C3
C5
C6
B4
C11
D1
C17
D4
C18
D5
D6
C19
D11
D12
D13
D14
D17D19
D20
D21
D23
Figure 1: Timeline of first appearance of key features (colors:
black → anti-analysis/evasion improvements, blue → new
functional features, red→ information leaks)
feature, the time presented corresponds to the earliest sample we
found implementing this feature. Note that all the features do not
necessarily accumulate in later samples. For instance, the rootkit
capability is found in only three samples.
Antivirus detection rates.We submitted samples to VirusTotal
that we obtained directly from one of Wajam’s servers. We pooled a
known URL to retrieve daily samples as soon as possible after they
are released to observe early detection rates. In total, we collected
36 samples between Aug.—Nov. 2018; see Fig. 2 for the VirusTotal
detection rates. The rates are given relative to the release time as in-
dicated by the “Last-Modified” HTTP header provided by the server.
We trigger a rescan on VirusTotal approximately every hour after
the first submission to observe the evolution for up to two weeks.
Fig. 2 illustrates the averaged rates, along with the overall lowest
and highest rates during each hour. The rates converge to about
37 detections out of about 69 AV engines at the end of the two-
week period. Note that the total number of AV engines slightly
changes over time, as reported by VT. Importantly, we notice that
the rates start arguably low during the first hours. The lowest de-
tection ratio of 3/68 is found on the Aug. 8 sample, 19min after
its release. Only one AV labels Wajam correctly, another one iden-
tifies it as different malware, and the third one simply labels it
“ML.Attribute.HighConfidence.” Similarly, the sample from Apr. 29
is flagged by 4/71 AVs, three of them label it with “heuristic”, “sus-
picious” and “Trojan.Generic,” suggesting that they merely detect
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Figure 2: VirusTotal detection rates of 36 samples starting
from their release time
some oddities. The average rate during the first hour is only about
9 AVs. The quick rise in the number of detections in the first 2–3
days are hindered by new daily releases that restart the cycle from
a low detection rate. We believe this strategy has helped Wajam
continue to spread for years despite the (late) detections.
Moreover, Wajam is rarely labeled as is by AVs. Rather, they
often output generic names1 or mislabel samples.2 Certain AVs
label Wajam as PUP/not-a-virus/Riskware/Optional;3 however, we
note that depending on the configuration of such AVs, no alert or
action may be triggered upon detection, or the alert may show
differently than for regular malware [26, 29]. Also, once installed,
the detection rate of the installer is irrelevant. Rather, the detection
of individual critical files matter. For instance, while D23’s detection
rate is 35/66 AVs after 15 days, its installed files remain less detected:
26/66 for the uninstaller after 16 days, 16/67 for the main binary
after 22 days, and 9/69 for the network driver after 26 days.
7 PREVALENCE
We illustrate the prevalence of Wajam through the popularity of
its domains and a brief overview of worldwide infections.
7.1 Domains popularity
First, we list the domain names used by Wajam, as found in code
signing certificates, hardcoded URLs in samples, ad injection rules
we downloaded, and domains declared in legal documents of the
company [52]. We also gather domain names that were hosted
simultaneously from the same IP address or subnet,4 then manu-
ally verify whether they resemble other Wajam domains. We also
rely on domains found in CT logs that follow the pattern technolo-
gie*.com or *technology.com, as we found it is recurrent. We query
all the 14,944 matching domains and keep the ones that serve a web-
page referring to Wajam/Social2Search/SearchAwesome (similar
to wajam.com), share the same favicon as previously identified, or
1 “Win32.Adware-gen”, “heuristic”, “Trojan.Gen.2”, “Unsafe”
2 “Adware.Zdengo”, “Gen:Variant.Nemesis.430”
3 “Generic PUA PC (PUA)”, “PUP/Win32.Agent.C2840632”, “PUA:Win32/Wajam”, “not-a-
virus:HEUR:AdWare.Win32.Agent.gen”, “Pua.Wajam”, “Riskware.NSISmod!”, “Riskware”,
“PUP.Optional.Wajam”
4We leverage historical DNS data from DnsTrails.com.
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Figure 3: Wajam domains in Umbrella’s top list (2017–2019)
distribute Wajam’s installer from a predefined URL. The complete
list of 332 domains is provided in Table 5 (Appendix). Note that not
all Wajam domains may follow these patterns, thus our domain list
is a lower bound on the total number of domains used.
This domain list rarely evolves over time, and most domains
follow the common pattern mentioned above. During our study,
they were hosted in France (OVH, under the same /24 subnet) and
the US (Secured Servers). Some served browser-trusted certificates
issued by RapidSSL until Mar. 2018, then by Let’s Encrypt. Many
domains were never issued a certificate.
We then search for the rank of these domains in Umbrella’s top
1M domain list from 2017 to 2019. Umbrella is the only public list
that tracks domain popularity from DNS queries, and thus, captures
the popularity of domains pooled for updates by Wajam, as well
as those serving ads after injection. Fig. 3 shows the number of
Wajam domains per daily list along with the highest ranking of
these domains. Over the last two years, we found as many as 53
domains with the top ranked one reaching the 29,427th position.
However, given the number of domains concurrently used, the
highest rank is not the best measure to represent the overall do-
mains popularity. Borrowing the idea from Le Pochat et al. [40], we
consider that the popularity follows a Zipf distribution and com-
bine all Wajam domains into one rank by following the Dowdall
rule. This rule attributes a weight to each domain that is inversely
proportional to its rank. The rank of a combination of domains is
the inverse of the sum of their weights. If all Wajam domain re-
quests were intended to only one domain, this domain would rank
between 27,895th and 5,246th during the past 28 months (ignoring
the sudden drops in the first half of 2017). Such a rank indirectly
hints at a significant number of infections.
We note a slight decline in popularity over this period; however,
it may not necessarily correlate with a reduction of Wajam’s activ-
ities, i.e., the popularity is only relative. Also, our domain list may
miss newer popular domains, especially if they do not follow the
identified naming scheme.
7.2 Worldwide infections
We leverage a residential proxy service (Luminati5) to query 89
domains where Wajam injects ads. Each peer runs a client that
allows other peers (i.e., us) to relay network traffic through it. We
found that Wajam only relies on a blacklist of processes (see Sec-
tion 10), which does not include the Luminati client process name.
Therefore, if Wajam has infected a peer, we expect that our traffic
will be intercepted by the peer’s Wajam instance, and we should
obtain a Wajam-issued certificate for the domains queried.
We consider the domains found in the 101 injection rules fetched
in Jan. 2019 (see Section 10), then we remove Google- and LinkedIn-
related domains since Luminati does not permit querying them.
We then establish TLS connections to these domains through 4.2M
peers in all countries available. Note that the domains only relate
to search engines and shopping websites, thus no illegitimate or
dangerous websites are accessed through the peers. In addition,
due to high bandwidth costs of Luminati, we only establish a TLS
connection and retrieve the certificate, then close the socket, i.e.,
no HTTP query is made. Using this setup, we can only detect the
second and fourth generations. Since the third generation only
modifies traffic by hooking selected browser processes, a Luminati
peer infected with this generation would not intercept our traffic.
To detect Wajam-issued certificates, we rely on fingerprints we
established based on the reverse-engineering of the certificate gen-
eration (see Section 12). We performed our scans in Mar. 2019. We
detected 52 cases in 25 countries: Indonesia (10 infected peers),
Malaysia (4); Argentina, India, Italy, Philippines (3); Brazil, Canada,
Chile, France, Honduras, Spain, Thailand, Vietnam (2); Australia,
Côte d’Ivoire, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Mexico, Netherlands,
Peru, Russia, the US, and Venezuela (1).
During a similar scan we conducted through Luminati in June
2017 through 911k peers in only 33 countries fromReporterWithout
Border’s list [54], we detected 214 cases in 19 countries: Vietnam
(98 infected peers), India (42), Malaysia (16), Thailand (12), the UK
(7), Hong Kong (6), Belarus (5), Venezuela (5); Egypt, France, Libya,
Pakistan (3); Iran, Russia, Turkey, the US (2); South Korea, Sri Lanka,
and Yemen (1).
Note that peers on Luminati network are not necessarily rep-
resentative of the general population, therefore the proportion of
infections might not be informative. However, Wajam was found
in a total of 35 countries between 2017 and 2019, highlighting the
scope of its infections.
8 PRIVATE INFORMATION LEAKS
Beyond installing the files onto the system, the installer also per-
forms other core tasks, including the generation of unique IDs, and
leaking browsing and download histories. We detect these leaks
from the network captures and trace their origin into the binaries
to better understand them.
Two unique identifiers are generated during installation based on
a combination of the MAC address, user folder path, and disk serial
number. These IDs are appended to all requests made to Wajam’s
servers and ads distributors. They are used for ad tracking, and to
detect repeated installations to identify pay-per-install frauds by
5Advertised with 40M peers, https://luminati.io
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Wajam distributors, i.e., a distributor faking numerous installations
to increase its revenue from Wajam [49].
From B1, the installer leaks the list of installed programs as found
in the registry, minus Microsoft-specific updates in some cases. The
OS version and the date of the installation obtained from Wajam’s
own timestamping service, are also sent in each query.
From C6, the browsing history of IE, Firefox and Chrome is sent
in plaintext to Wajam’s servers, along with the history of Opera
fromD6. Only the newest sample we analyzed, dated from July 2018,
sends this information over HTTPS. This leak is the most privacy-
sensitive. For users who do not configure an expiration of their
history, the leak could span over several months’ worth of private
data. In Chrome, the local history expires after three months [7],
mitigating the extent of the leak; however, other browsers do not
expire their history, which could last for years. In parallel, the
download history, i.e., the URLs of downloaded files, is also sent in
plaintext except in the latest sample.
After the installation,Wajam continues to send the list of browser
addons/extensions, installed programs, and detected AVs whenever
it fetches updates from the server.
Samples dated after the end of 2016 (from D5) check whether
they are running on a virtual machine by calling the CPUID in-
struction. The result is appended to all HTTP(S) queries made by
the installer, along with the BIOS manufacturer name, which could
also expose the hypervisor. We are unsure about the consequences
of this reporting as we still observed fully functional samples in
our VMs (with complete updates and injected ads).
9 ANTI-ANALYSIS AND EVASION
Wajam leverages at least 23 techniques to hinder static analysis,
fingerprinting, reverse engineering, and antivirus detection: 1)meta-
morphism, 2) changing static resources, 3) nested executables, 4)
payload compression and encryption, 5) steganography, 6) custom
encryption and encoding, 7) obfuscated key reconstruction, 8) ob-
fuscated installer script, 9 obfuscated .NET and PowerShell, 10)
auto-whitelisting in Windows Defender, 11) disabling MRT, 12) in-
flated files, 13) string obfuscation and encryption, 14) dynamic API
calls, 15) junk and dead code, 16) encrypted code, 17) anti-IDA Pro
measures, 18) unique readable strings as function arguments, 19)
randomized names, 20) rootkit, 21) persistence/resurrection module,
22) detection of installed antiviruses (only leaks the result), and 23)
digital signatures (or the lack thereof).
We discuss below the newer techniques and those that have been
improved or are specific to Wajam; for others, see Appendix A.
T1: Metamorphism. The main technique is to produce metamor-
phic variants, i.e., an obfuscated packer that changes dynamically its
logic around the same template and evolves through generations. It
unpacks varying payloads that perform similar actions. This trans-
lates in numerous variants, which are released daily, mostly around
3–5pm UTC since at least 2018. Variants seems to be released auto-
matically, hence it would be interesting to identify the underlying
generator. However, we could not find any name or fingerprint.
T5: Steganography. Starting from D14, the installer unpacks a
handful of small DLL files, and a large picture or audio file (MP3,
WAV, BMP, GIF, PNG). At first, this media file appears to contain
only random audio noise or colors, and could be a simple dummy
Algorithm 1 Custom stream cipher in samples D17 and above
Input: ciphertext c , first key key1 , second key key2
Output: plaintext p
p ← []
for i from 0 to len(c) − 1 do
p[i] ← c[i] ⊕ key1[i mod len(key1)]
key1[i] ← p[i]
p[i] ← p[i] ⊕ key2[i mod len(key2)]
key2[i] ← p[i]
end for
file only useful to arbitrarily inflate the installer’s size (cf. [32]).
The DLLs are, in fact, used to reconstruct an encrypted compressed
nested installer. The payload is simply stuffed into data sections
of the media file. For instance, in D14, an MP3 file is composed of
MPEG frames starting with a four-byte header and followed by 622
bytes of data. We found that the DLL extracts and concatenates the
data section from each frame to reconstruct a GZip file, which in
turn reveals a second NSIS installer. From D20, the payload starts
from an arbitrary offset, complicating automated deobfuscation.
To the best of our knowledge, only few cases of malware lever-
aging steganography are known, and they relied on a single format
and trivial encryption [11, 45]. Wajam thus brings steganography
to multiple formats, with added obfuscation.
T6: Custom encryption and encoding. While payload encryp-
tion was usually done with RC4 or XOR, a custom stream cipher
is used starting from D17 for the nested installer, outlined in Algo-
rithm 1. From D20, the encryption becomes difficult to comprehend
as it involves more than 2000 decompiled lines of C code, with nu-
merous branches and inter-dependent loops. The decryption seems
to update an intermediate state, and may likely be a stream cipher;
however, we could not identify which one. Alternatively, it could
be a form of encoding since we could not find an associated key
either. Malware is known to modify encryption routines; however,
the changes are small enough and the underlying algorithm is still
identifiable, e.g., modified RC4 in Citadel [13].
T12: Inflated files. Some malware scanners are known to discard
large files [17, 41], hence an obvious anti-analysis technique is to
inflate the size of the executable. Seven samples rely on enlarged
.rdata (C17, D4) or code sections (D6–10), resulting in binaries
ranging from 9 to 26MiB in size. The first type consists of a large
.rdata section that contains strings duplicated hundreds of times.
However, this section contains actual strings used in the unobfus-
cated application. Given that such strings are meant to be decrypted
at runtime, it is unclear why the developers left plaintext strings in
the binary, or if large .rdata sections are at all meant for evasion.
Large code sections tend to slow IDA Pro’s analysis, possibly due
to gibberish instructions parsed.
The goblin DLL is also sometimes decrypted at runtime and writ-
ten back to disk, at which point it is inflated by appending 10MiB
of apparently random data. In addition, the size of the installer
increases over time and heavily fluctuates in the fourth generation,
between 4–10MiB, depending on the size of the installed files. In
turn, the unpacked file sizes depend on T15.
T15: Junk and dead code. Junk/dead code usually involves adding,
replacing, or reordering instructions [25, 53]. Wajam’s junk code is
quite distinct fromwhat can be found in the literature. It involves: 1)
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Table 2: Steganographic techniques to hide a nested installer in samples from end-2017 to 2018
ID Hidden in Payload reconstruction Encryption/Compression Stream encryption keys
D14–15 MP3 Concatenated MPEG frame data plaintext (GZip) Not applicable
D16 MP3 Concatenated MPEG frame data custom encryption Not applicable
D17 GIF In section after LSD + custom offset custom stream cipher+compression 2njZEYFf, qsjmoRZ7FM
D18 BMP BitmapLine section + custom offset custom stream cipher+encryption+compression ldXTyqwQ, ckXKI19jmC
D19 WAV First DataChunk samples + custom offset custom stream cipher+compression 47txnKuG, eyimwKIOBG
string manipulation on large random strings, 2) inter-register opera-
tions, 3) calls toWindows library functions that only swap or return
some fixed values, 4) tests on the result of such dummy functions, 5)
large never-executed conditional branches, and 6) dependence on
global variables. Useful operations are thus interleaved with such
junk code. Due to modifications that are sometimes made to global
variables common to many functions, these functions are not deter-
ministic from their inputs, thus junk code removal is challenging.
For instance, in D17, the DLLs that read and decode media files (T5),
contain more than 2000 and 400 junk functions, respectively, that
can be called up to a dozen times each. The resulting call graph is
also useless.
T17: Anti-IDA Pro measures. Encrypted code (T16) involves
multi-MiB placeholders in the code section to receive decrypted
instructions (the decryption is not in-place). They are pre-filled
with a single byte padding. As a byproduct of this technique, both
the padding and encrypted instructions are difficult to analyze by a
disassembler. For instance, IDA Pro hangs for over two hours on
sample D9, containing 4MiB of the byte B9 (interpreted as a jump
instruction), followed by another 3MiB of encrypted instructions.
T18: Unique readable strings as function arguments. Often,
functions are called with an argument that is a unique random
string, or a brief extract from public texts; e.g., we found strings
from the Polish version of Romeo and Juliet in D14–16, and from
The Art of War by Sun Tzu in D17,19,23. This technique could be
used to thwart heuristics (based on entropy or human-readable
text); however, we are unsure about its intended target.
T23: Digital signatures. Before D9, samples are digitally signed,
which could help the installer appear legitimate to users when
prompted for administrative rights (when distributed as a stan-
dalone app), and lower detection by AVs [37]. From D9 (i.e., shortly
after Wajam was sold to IMTL), only the network drivers are still
signed, as required by Windows. Presumably, since the signing
certificates are issued to Wajam’s domains, which could help AVs to
fingerprint the installer, and hence signatures were removed. Also,
Wajam already inherits admin privileges from the bundled software
installer that runs it and no longer triggers Windows UAC prompts.
From D20, the main installed binaries are also signed.
10 SECURITY THREATS
In this section, we discuss the security flaws we identified in Wa-
jam’s TLS proxy certificate validation, along with vulnerabilities of
its auto-update mechanisms that lead to arbitrary content injection
(with possible persistence) and privileged remote code execution.
Certificate validation issues. In the 2nd and 4th generations,
Wajam acts as a TLS proxy, and therefore is expected to validate
server certificates. FiddlerCore-based samples (2nd gen.) properly
Table 3: TLS root certificates in 2nd and 4th generations
Sample Root certificate’s Common Name
B1–B3 Wajam_root_cer
B4–B5 WNetEnhancer_root_cer
B6 WaNetworkEnhancer_root_cer
D1–D2 md5(GUID+‘WajaInterEn’)[0:16]
D3 md5(GUID+‘WNEn’)[0:16]
D4 md5(GUID+‘Social2Se’)[0:16]
D5–D8 md5(GUID+‘Socia2Sear’)[0:16]
D9 md5(GUID+‘Socia2Se’)[0:16]
D10 md5(GUID+‘Socia2S’)[0:16]
D11 md5(GUID+‘Soci2Sear’)[0:16]+‘ 2’
D12–D21 md5(GUID+‘SrcAAAesom’)[0:16]+‘ 2’
D22–D23 base64(md5(GUID+‘SrcAAAesom’)[0:12])+‘ 2’
do so. However, in ProtocolFilters-based samples (4th gen.), Wajam
fails to validate the hostname, since at least Apr. 2016 (D1). Thus,
a valid certificate for example.com is accepted by Wajam for any
other domain. Worse, Wajam even replaces the Common Name
(CN) from the server certificate with the domain requested by the
client. In turn, the browser accepts the certificate for the requested
domain as it trusts Wajam’s root certificate.
Swapping the CN with the requested domain is somewhat miti-
gated, since 1) CAs should include a Subject Alternate Name (SAN)
extension in their certificates, which is copied from the original
certificate by ProtocolFilters, and 2) browsers may ignore the CN
field in a certificate if a SAN extension is present. In particular,
Chrome rejects certificates without SAN [56]. Consequently, if an
attacker obtains a valid certificate for any domain without a SAN
extension, they are still able to perform a MITM attack against IE
and Firefox when Wajam is installed.
Despite the deprecation of CN as a way of binding a certificate to
a domain [55] in 2000, Kumar et al. [39] recently showed that one of
the most common errors in certificate issuance by publicly trusted
CAs is the lack of a SAN extension. For the sake of our experiment,
we inserted our own root certificate in the Windows trust store and
issued a certificate without SAN for evil.com. Wajam successfully
accepted it when visiting google.com, and the Wajam-generated
certificate in turn was accepted by IE.
Shared root private key.We located the code in ProtocolFilters
responsible to create the root certificate used for interception. The
code either generates an RSA-2048 private key (using OpenSSL),
or use a default hardcoded one. Unfortunately, the default settings
are used and all 4th generation samples share the same key. We
performed a successful MITM attack on our test system using a test
domain. Consequently, an attacker could impersonate any HTTPS
websites to a machine runningWajam’s fourth generation by know-
ing the root certificate’s CN to properly chain the generated certifi-
cates. However, the CN is based on the Machine GUID, as illustrated
in Table 3 (more details in Appendix D).
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Since theMachine GUID is unpredictable and generally unknown
to an attacker, and since the resulting CN carries at least 48 bits
of entropy in our dataset (starting from D22, 64 bits in prior sam-
ples), crafting certificates signed by a targetWajam’s root certificate
is generally impractical. Indeed, an attacker would need to serve
an expected number of 247 certificates to a victim before one is
accepted. We note that environments with cloned Windows instal-
lations across hosts could be more vulnerable if the Machine GUID
is not properly regenerated on each host, as it is possible to obtain
it from a single host with few privileges.
Nevertheless, during our scans through residential proxies (see
Section 7), we also found cases of injected scripts pointing toWajam
domains with much shorter issuer CNs, e.g., “MDM5Z 2” providing
under 15 bits of entropy (see Appendix D). This could indicate more
recent variants are at higher risks of MITM attacks.
The FiddlerCore-based generation is immune to this issue as
keys are randomly generated at install-time using MakeCert.
Auto-update mechanism.Wajam periodically fetches traffic in-
jections rules, browser hooking configurations, and program up-
dates. Updates are fetched upon first launch, then Wajam waits for
a duration indicated in the last update (from 50 to 80 minutes in our
tests), before it updates again. While early samples fetched plaintext
files, all recent samples and the whole 4th generation download
encrypted files. The decryption is handled in an encrypted DLL
loaded at runtime. We found that Wajam uses the MCrypt library to
decrypt updates with a hardcoded key and IV using the Rijndael-256
cipher (256-bit block, key and IV) in CFB-8mode. The key and IV are
the same across all versions. The content of such updates and the
implications of lacking the proper protection are discussed below.
Downgraded website security. From the 2nd generation, Wajam
fetches traffic injections rules, containing a list of domains and
instructions to inject scripts. The injection file is a JSON structure
containing “supported websites.” For each website, a list of regular
expressions are provided to match URLs of interest, often specif-
ically about search or item description pages, along with specific
JavaScript and CSS URLs to be injected from one of Wajam’s several
possible domains. The rules also include HTTP headers or tags to
be added or removed.
Since the content injection relies on loading a remote third-
party script, browsers may refuse to load the content due to mixed-
content policies, or the Content Security Policy (CSP) configured by
the website. Mixed-content is addressed by loading the script over
the same protocol as the current website. For websites that specify
a CSP HTTP header or HTML tag, Wajam removes this CSP from
the server’s response before it reaches the browser, to ensure their
script is properly loaded. Wajam removes the CSP from Facebook,
mail.ru, Yandex, flipkart.com, and Yahoo Search; see Fig. 4 where
the CSP header is dropped from facebook.com.
Other response headers are also removed in some cases, includ-
ing Access-Control-Allow-Origin, which would allow the given
website’s resources to be fetched from different origins than those
explicitly allowed by the website, and X-Frame-Options (e.g., on
rambler.ru), enabling the website to be loaded in a frame.
Such behaviors not only allow injected scripts to be success-
fully loaded and fetch information, but also effectively downgrade
website security (e.g., XSS vulnerabilities may become exploitable).
[facebook]
[domains]
[0] => facebook
[patterns]
[0] =>
^https?:\/\/(www\.)?facebook.com(?!(\/xti\.php))
[js]
[0] =>
se_js.php?se=facebook&integration=searchenginev2
[css]
[headers]
[remove]
[response]
[0] => content-security-policy
Figure 4: Example of traffic injection rule for facebook.com
that matches all pages except xti.php
{"version":"1",
"update_interval":60,
"base_url":"\/\/ attacker.evil \/",
"supported_sites":
{"bank":
{"domains":["bank"],
"patterns":["^https?:\\\/\\\/ login \\. bank \\.com"],
"js":["bank.js"],
"css":[],"version":"1"}},
"process_blacklist":[],
"process_whitelist":[],
"update_url":"https:\/\/ attacker.evil\/ mapping",
"css_base_url":"\/\/ attacker.evil\/css\/",
"url_filtering":[],
"bi_events":[],
"url_tracking":[],
"protocols_support":
{"quic_udp_block":1}}
Figure 5: Traffic injection rule to insert a malicious script
on login.bank.com located at //attacker.evil/bank.js, and redirect
future update queries to https://attacker.evil/mapping
Arbitrary content injection. Traffic injection rules are always
fetched over plain HTTP. Although updates are encrypted, an at-
tacker can learn the encryption algorithm and extract the hardcoded
key/IV from anyWajam sample in the last few years, to easily forge
updates and serve them to a victim through a simple MITM attack.
As a proof-of-concept, we suppose that bank.com is a banking
website with its login page at https://login.bank.com. We craft an
update file that instructs Wajam to insert a JavaScript file of our
choice, hosted on our own server, and encrypt it using the key
that we recovered. The plaintext traffic injection rule is provided
in Fig. 5. Once the update is fetched by Wajam (i.e., after around
an hour, or at boot time), and upon visiting the bank’s login page,
our malicious script is loaded on the bank’s page and is able to
manipulate the page’s objects, including listening to keystroke
events in the username and password fields. No default cross-origin
policy would prevent our attack. If the bank’s website implemented
a CSP, it could be easily removed from the server’s HTTP response.
We note that Wajam already has the infrastructure in place for
maliciously injecting any script into any website at will, by simply
distributing malicious updates. Such updates could be short-lived
for stealthiness, yet affect a large number of victims.
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<script data-type="injected" src="// technologietravassac.com/addon/script/google?integration=searchenginev2&har=2&
v=n11 .14.1.86& os_mj=6&os_mn=1&os_bitness=32&mid=b8230ac083f9fb5067a66e03b4882491&
uid=B77FCD732C2E5337FF907BFAA44758D1&aid=3673&aid2=none&ts=1531782569&ts2="></script>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="// main-social2search.netdna-ssl.com/css/cdn/min_search_engine_v2.css?
wv=1 .00434"/>
Figure 6: Example of injected content on google.com
Moreover, updates systematically contain the URL of the next
update to fetch. Once Wajam downloads an update and caches it
to disk, it does not use its hardcoded URL anymore. Hence, the
effect of a compromised update is persistent. Our malicious update
(Fig. 5) instructs Wajam to fetch further updates from our own
server, alleviating the need to repeatedly perform MITM attacks.
Privileged remote code execution.Wajam also queries for pro-
gram updates and retrieves the manifest of potential new versions.
Several parameters are passed, including Wajam’s current version,
and the list of detected security solutions, possibly influencing
which update is served. If an update is available, the URL where to
fetch a ZIP package is provided, which is downloaded and uncom-
pressed into the installation directory.
Similar to the attack on traffic injection rules, it is possible to
serve a fake update manifest to trigger an update from a mali-
cious URL before mid-Feb. 2018 (D18), while software updates were
fetched over HTTP. This would enable an attacker to inject its
own binary that will be run with SYSTEM privileges; however, we
have not tested this attack. Starting from D18, software updates are
fetched over HTTPS and it appears that Wajam properly validates
the server certificate, mitigating this attack.
11 CONTENT INJECTION
We discuss below the domains targeted for injection, and the con-
tent injected into webpages. We also summarize the specificities of
the 3rd generation that conducts MITB attacks.
11.1 Targeted domains
The injection rules fetched between Feb. to July 2018 always include
100 regular expressions to match the domains of major websites,
with only one change during this period. The injected domains
include popular search engines, social networks, blogging platforms,
and various other localized businesses in North America, Western
Europe, Russia, and Asia. The list contains notable websites, e.g.,
Google, Yahoo, Bing, TripAdvisor, eBay, BestBuy, Ask, YouTube,
Twitter, Facebook, Kijiji, Reddit, as well as country-specificwebsites,
e.g., rakuten.co.jp, alibaba.com, baidu.com, leboncoin.fr, willhaben.at,
mail.ru. The total number of websites that are subject to content
injection is not easy to quantify due to the nature of some URL
matching rules, e.g., in the case of the blogging platformWordpress,
blogs are hosted as a subdomain of wordpress.com and Wajam’s
rules match any subdomain, which could be several millions [77].
11.2 Injected content
On URLs matching the injection rules, Wajam injects a JavaScript
and CSS right before the </head> tag, a feature provided by Proto-
colFilters. The scripts are either self-contained in early samples, or
they insert remote scripts with parameters including Wajam’s ver-
sion, the OS version/architecture, the two unique IDs (see Section 8),
an advertiser ID, and the installation timestamp; see Fig. 6. The
remote JavaScript URL script injected into the page is dependent
on the visited website. Two categories of websites are distinguished
here: search engines, and shopping websites. We give below an
example for each case.
Search engines. There are three possible behaviors that we ob-
served when visiting a search engine website. For instance, when
searching on google.com, Wajam can change the action on the first
few results’ links returned byGoogle. In effect, when a user clicks on
these results, the original link opens in a new browser tab while the
original tab loads a series of ad trackers (including Yahoo and Bing)
provided with the keywords searched by the user, and eventually
lands on an undesirable page, e.g., a search result page from infor-
mationvine.com about foreign exchange. Alternatively, the script
may just redirect the user to searchpage.com, a domain that be-
longs to Wajam, which in turn redirects to a Yahoo search result
page with the user’s original search keywords. A user may not
notice that her original search on Google is eventually served by
Yahoo. In the meantime, her keyword searches are sent to Wa-
jam’s server. Also, the Yahoo result URL contains parameters that
may indicate an affiliation with Wajam, i.e., hspart=wajam and
type=wjsearchpage_ya_3673_fja6rh1. Finally, Wajam may sim-
ply insert several search results that it fetched from its servers, as
the top results. Wajam performs a seamless integration of those
results in the page, breaching the trust that a user has in the search
engine results. This behavior is part of a patent owned by Wajam
Internet Technologies Inc [9].
Shopping websites.When searching on ebay.com, Wajam loads a
180KiB JavaScript file (more than 7700 SLOC) containing the Priam
engine intended to retrieve search keywords, fetch related ads, and
integrate them on the page. This engine seems self-contained and
embeds several libraries. It has numerous methods to manipulate
page elements and cookies. Inserted ads are shown at the top of the
result list in a large format, also seamlessly integrated, thanks to
injected CSS. When the user clicks one of the ads, she is redirected
to a third party website selling products related to her search.
In both cases, one of the unique IDs generated by Wajam’s in-
staller accompanies each URL pointing to Wajam’s domains. In the
end, both Wajam and the advertisers can build a profile of the user
based on her searches.
11.3 Browser hooking rules
The third generation specifically retrieves a browser hooking con-
figuration file with offsets of functions to be hooked in a number of
browsers and versions. Unlike the traffic injection rules, the browser
hooking rules are preloaded in the installer. Hence, it is possible to
study their evolution in time.
The earliest third generation sample (Nov. 2014, C1) only includes
addresses of functions to be hooked for 47 versions of Chrome, from
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version 18 to 39. The file also lists supported versions of IE and
Firefox, although old and without specific function addresses. In
Sept. 2015 (C6), Wajam introduces the support for seven versions
of the Opera browser. Two months later, five other Chromium-
based browsers are introduced, of which four are adware, i.e.,
BrowserAir, BoBrowser, CrossBrowser, MyBrowser; and one is a
legitimate browser intended for Vietnamese users, i.e., Coc Coc.
By Jan. 2016 (C10), 200 versions of Chrome are supported, up to
version 49.0.2610.0 with finer granularity for intermediate versions.
Wajam’s browser hooking DLL name was blacklisted in Chrome
in Nov. 2014 [59] because it could cause crashes. Other blacklisted
DLLs are labeled in the comments as adware, malware or keylogger,
but Wajam is not. One month later (in C3), Wajam randomized this
DLL name, making the blacklist ineffective.
Although we did not capture any new sample from the third
generation after Jan. 2016, we noticed that the browser hooking
rules are kept up-to-date, suggesting that this generation is still
actively maintained and possibly distributed. In an update from
July 2018, we count 1176 supported Chrome versions including
the latest Canary build, and additional Chromium-based browsers,
e.g., Torch, UC Browser, and Amigo Browser. Versions of Opera are
outdated by more than a year. Other Chromium-based browsers
only have entries for a limited number of selected versions.
Wajam avoids intercepting non-browser applications as evident
from a blacklist of process names in the update file, e.g., dropbox.exe,
skype.exe, bittorrent.exe. Additionally, a whitelist is also present,
including the name of supported browser processes; however, it
appears not to be used. Furthermore, Wajam seems to have had
difficulties handling certain protocols and compression algorithms
in the past. It disables SPDY in Firefox and SDCH compression in
Chrome before v46.
12 DIRECTIONS FOR BETTER DETECTION
Security solutions overall fail to statically analyze Wajam’s in-
stallers and binaries. Unless such binaries are submitted for analysis,
possibly because they look suspicious and endpoint solutions may
decide to upload them to the antivirus cloud, Wajam can still be in-
stalled on most user systems due to its daily metamorphic installer.
We identified simple fingerprints that could hint at an infection,
either from the host or network activities. First, Wajam registers an
installed product on the system using either a known registry key
or known names (e.g., SearchAwesome), which could be blacklisted.
Then, it tries to add its installation folder and network driver as
exceptions for Windows Defender, which could help locate Wa-
jam’s binaries. Moreover, Wajam uses a long but bounded list of
domains so far. A simple domain blacklist would prevent Wajam to
communicate with its servers and leak private information. Samples
communicating in plaintext can further be fingerprinted due to the
URL patterns and type of data sent, i.e., list of installed programs.
Later samples that leverage HTTPS at install-time and later to fetch
updates could still be fingerprinted due to known domains present
in the TLS SNI extension, or simply by blacklisting corresponding
IP addresses. Since daily variants of Wajam are served from known
domains at known directories, it is possible for security solutions to
constantly monitor these servers for new samples and create corre-
sponding signatures earlier. When a new system driver is installed,
additional verifications could quickly find out Wajam’s driver as it
is signed with a certificate for one of the known domains.
Finally, we were able to build fingerprints for Wajam-issued cer-
tificates, shown in Table 6. It is possible to match a leaf certificate’s
distinguished name (DN) with our patterns to confirm whether it
has been issued by Wajam. They may be particularly relevant if
integrated into browsers to warn users. Chrome already detects
well-known software performing MITM to alert users of possible
misconfigurations or unwanted interceptions [27].
The use of ProtocolFilters can also be fingerprinted by the files
and folder structure it sets up. Online searches for malware “2.cer”
and “SSL” “cert.db” “*.cer” yield several forum discussions about
infections, e.g., Win.Dropper.Mikey, iTranslator, ContentProtec-
tor, SearchProtectToolbar, GSafe, OtherSearch, and even a security
solution (Protegent Total Security, from India). Most of these appli-
cations likely use ProtocolFilters’ default key, as we could verify for
Protegent, and hence make end users vulnerable to MITM attacks,
in addition to being a nuisance. More work is needed to understand
the extent of the use of this interception SDK.
13 WAJAM CLONES
While searching for other ProtocolFilters-enabled applications, we
also stumbled upon OtherSearch (also known as FlowSurf/Clever-
Adds). This adware application shares very similar obfuscation,
evasion and steganography techniques with Wajam, sometimes in
a more or less advanced way, to the point that it is mislabeled as
Wajam when detected by AVs. For instance, it disables MRT (T11)
and also SmartScreen, and randomizes file paths as done in Wa-
jam (T19). The installer also leverages steganography (T5) to run
a second installer hidden in media files; however, it uses a custom
ZIP extractor instead of NSIS. Moreover, OtherSearch also embeds
ProtocolFilters’ default key in its root certificate, but does not ran-
domize the issuer names (T19), thus exposing all its victims to trivial
MITM attacks on HTTPS traffic. However, OtherSearch does not
leak the browser histories. We did not observe variants served daily
at known URLs, thus we are unsure whether OtherSearch leverages
such poly/metamorphism technique (T1).
We could not find an organizational connection between Wajam
and OtherSearch, thus suggesting that bothmay leverage a common
third-party obfuscation framework, or simply share similar ideas. A
recent report by McAfee suggests that adware vendors delegate the
obfuscation job to “freelancers” [23]. Hence, the same third party
could have been hired by both businesses.
We also note that one network request, made during the instal-
lation of OtherSearch to report a successful installation, triggers a
non-interpreted PHP script on the server side; this leaks the creden-
tials for an Internet-facing MySQL database. We gathered simple
statistics over this database and found that it contains over 100 mil-
lion Google searches and associated clicked results from the past
1.5 years (nearly 20GiB). 6.54M records are associated with unique
IDs, indicating a large number of potential victims. Two third of the
searches seem to originate from France, as hinted by the domain
google.fr in the search queries. We reported the whereabouts of this
database to the hosting provider (OVH) and on the French Ministry
of Interior’s report platform on Apr. 17, 2019.
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14 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Apparently, the adware business is a Pandora’s Box that stayed
overlooked for too long, which leverages interesting known and
newer anti-analysis techniques for successful evasion, and results
into disastrous security and privacy violations. If such threats were
taken seriously, the bar could easily be raised to thwart the most lu-
dicrous of them. For instance, the 332 domains that belong toWajam
could be tracked and blacklisted. The daily released samples issued
from some of these domains could be monitored and blacklisted
within minutes. Fixed registry keys created during installation that
have not changed in years are enough to kill all related processes
and quarantine them. Unfortunately, this is not the case as of today.
Compared to previous recent studies on adware, we provide an
in-depth look into a widespread strain in particular, and provide
insights into the business and technical evolutions. We uncovered
several anti-analysis and antivirus evasion techniques. We also
identified important security risks and privacy leakages. Consider-
ing the huge amount of private data collected by its operators, and
the number of installations it made, it is surprising that it remained
virtually overlooked and fully functional for many years. Perhaps,
“adware” applications do not present themselves as much attractive
targets for analysis. However, we hope that the security community
will recognize the need for better scrutiny of such applications, and
more generally PUPs, as they tend to survive and evolve into more
robust variants.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is party supported by a grant from CIRA.ca’s Community
Investment Program. The first author was supported in part by a
Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship (CGS). The second author is
supported in part by an NSERC Discovery Grant.
REFERENCES
[1] 2015. Lenovo PCs ship with man-in-the-middle adware that breaks HTTPS
connections. News article (Feb. 19, 2015). http://arstechnica.com/security/
2015/02/lenovo-pcs-ship-with-man-in-the-middle-adware-that-breaks-https-
connections/.
[2] 2015. PrivDog SSL compromise potentially worse than Superfish. News article
(Apr. 24, 2015). http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240241126/PrivDog-
SSL-compromise-potentially-worse-than-Superfish.
[3] 2018. Process Monitor v3.50. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/
downloads/procmon.
[4] 0xd4d. 2018. de4dot. https://github.com/0xd4d/de4dot.
[5] Daniello Alto. 2015. 7-zip 15.10 no longer decompiles NSIS script. Reply to
forum post (Dec. 7, 2015). https://sourceforge.net/p/sevenzip/discussion/45797/
thread/5d10a376/#6e1d/3fa3/6840/fe9c.
[6] Dennis Andriesse, Christian Rossow, Brett Stone-Gross, Daniel Plohmann, and
Herbert Bos. 2013. Highly resilient peer-to-peer botnets are here: An analysis of
Gameover Zeus. In MALWARE’13. Fajardo, PR, USA.
[7] Anonymous. 2015. Keeping history saved for longer than 3 months. Chrome
issue 500239. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=500239.
[8] Manos Antonakakis, Tim April, Michael Bailey, Matt Bernhard, Elie Bursztein,
Jaime Cochran, Zakir Durumeric, J. Alex Halderman, Luca Invernizzi, Michalis
Kallitsis, Deepak Kumar, Chaz Lever, Zane Ma, Joshua Mason, Damian Menscher,
Chad Seaman, Nick Sullivan, Kurt Thomas, and Yi Zhou. 2017. Understanding
the Mirai Botnet. In USENIX Security Symposium. Vancouver, BC, Canada.
[9] Martin-Luc Archambault, Sébastien Giroux, and André-Philippe Paquet. 2013.
Method and system for aggregating searchable web content from a plurality of
social networks and presenting search results. US Patent 2013/0179427 A1.
[10] BankInfoSecurity.com. 2017. Zeus Banking Trojan Spawn: Alive and Kicking.
News article (Nov. 24, 2017). https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/zeus-banking-
trojan-spawn-alive-kicking-a-10471.
[11] Dmitry Bestuzhev. 2011. Steganography or encryption in bankers? Kasper-
sky Labs blog article (Nov. 10, 2011). https://securelist.com/steganography-or-
encryption-in-bankers-11/31650/.
[12] Hamad Binsalleeh, Thomas Ormerod, Amine Boukhtouta, Prosenjit Sinha, AmrM.
Youssef, Mourad Debbabi, and Lingyu Wang. 2010. On the analysis of the Zeus
botnet crimeware toolkit. In PST’10. Ottawa, ON, Canada.
[13] Paul Black and Joseph Opacki. 2016. Anti-analysis trends in banking malware.
In MALWARE’16. Fajardo, PR, USA.
[14] Hanno Böck. 2015. More TLS Man-in-the-Middle failures - Adguard,
Privdog again and ProtocolFilters.dll. Blog article (Aug. 13, 2015).
https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/874-More-TLS-Man-in-the-Middle-failures-
Adguard,-Privdog-again-and-ProtocolFilters.dll.html.
[15] Booz Allen Dark LabsâĂŹ Advanced Threat Hunt. 2017. Advanced Persistent
Adware: Analysis of Nation-State Level Tactics. https://www.boozallen.com/s/
insight/blog/advanced-persistent-adware.html.
[16] Chris Brook. 2017. Mirai IoT Botnet Co-Authors Plead Guilty. News article (Dec.
14, 2017). https://digitalguardian.com/blog/mirai-iot-botnet-co-authors-plead-
guilty.
[17] BullGuard. 2019. Antivirus settings. https://www.bullguard.com/support/
product-guides/internet-security/guides-for-current-version/main/antivirus-
settings.aspx.
[18] Eric Chien. 2015. Techniques of Adware and Spyware. Symantec white
paper (Nov. 2005). https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/techniques.of.
adware.and.spyware.pdf.
[19] Satish Chimakurthi. 2016. Malware Hides in Installer to Avoid Detection. McAfee
blug article (Aug. 25, 2016). https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-
hides-in-installer-to-avoid-detection/.
[20] Cisco Umbrella. 2016. 1 Million. Blog article (Dec. 14, 2016). https://blog.opendns.
com/2016/12/14/cisco-umbrella-1-million/.
[21] Zammis Clark. 2015. Komodia rootkit findings. https://gist.github.com/Wack0/
f865ef369eb8c23ee028.
[22] CrowdStrike. 2018. Hybrid Analysis. https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/.
[23] Oliver Devane and Charles Crofford. 2018. Pay-Per-Install Company
Deceptively Floods Market with Unwanted Programs The History
of WakeNet AB, a Major PPI Player. Tech report (Dec. 3, 2018).
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/pay-per-
install-company-deceptively-floods-market-with-unwanted-programs/.
[24] ESET. 2018. What is a potentially unwanted application or potentially unwanted
content? ESET Knowledge Base ID: KB2629. https://support.eset.com/kb2629/.
[25] Yuxin Gao, Zexin Lu, and Yuqing Luo. 2014. Survey on malware anti-analysis. In
Fifth International Conference on Intelligent Control and Information Processing.
IEEE, 270–275.
[26] Babu Nath Giri, Prashanth P. Ramagopal, and Vinoo Thomas. 2016. Alerting the
presence of bundled software during an installation. US Patent 2016/0328223 A1.
[27] Google. 2018. SSL error assistant. Chromium source code.
https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/chrome/browser/resources/ssl/ssl_
error_assistant/ssl_error_assistant.asciipb.
[28] Garrett M. Graff. 2017. Inside the Hunt for Russia’s Most Notorious Hacker.
News article (Mar. 21, 2017). https://www.wired.com/2017/03/russian-hacker-
spy-botnet/.
[29] HowToGeek.com. 2017. Here’sWhat HappensWhen You Install the Top 10 Down-
load.com Apps. Tech. article (Apr. 3, 2017. https://www.howtogeek.com/198622/
heres-what-happens-when-you-install-the-top-10-download.com-apps/).
[30] Internet World Stats. 2019. Internet Growth Statistics. https://www.
internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm.
[31] IOActive. 2012. Reversal and Analysis of Zeus and SpyEye Banking Trojans. Tech-
nical White Paper. https://ioactive.com/pdfs/ZeusSpyEyeBankingTrojanAnalysis.
pdf.
[32] Suguru Ishimaru. 2017. Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of
Big Data. Kaspersky Labs blog article (Apr. 13, 2017). https://securelist.com/old-
malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/.
[33] Jason Jones. 2012. The State of Web Exploit Kits. In BlackHat’12. Las Vegas, NV,
USA.
[34] Kaspersky. 2017. Not-a-Virus: What is it? Blog article (Aug. 21, 2017). https:
//www.kaspersky.com/blog/not-a-virus/18015/.
[35] Amin Kharraz, William K. Robertson, Davide Balzarotti, Leyla Bilge, and Engin
Kirda. 2015. Cutting the Gordian Knot: A Look Under the Hood of Ransomware
Attacks. In DIMVA’15. Milan, Italy.
[36] Platon Kotzias, Leyla Bilge, and Juan Caballero. 2016. Measuring PUP Preva-
lence and PUP Distribution through Pay-Per-Install Services. In USENIX Security
Symposium. Austin, TX, USA.
[37] Platon Kotzias, Srdjan Matic, Richard Rivera, and Juan Caballero. 2015. Certified
PUP: Abuse in Authenticode Code Signing. In CCS’15. Denver, CO, USA.
[38] Brian Krebs. 2011. SpyEye Targets Opera, Google Chrome Users. Blog arti-
cle (Apr. 26 2011). https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/04/spyeye-targets-opera-
google-chrome-users/.
[39] Deepak Kumar, Michael Bailey, Zhengping Wang, Matthew Hyder, Joseph Dick-
inson, Gabrielle Beck, David Adrian, Joshua Mason, Zakir Durumeric, and J Alex
Halderman. 2018. Tracking Certificate Misissuance in the Wild. In IEEE S&P. San
Francisco, CA, US.
13
, , Carnavalet and Mannan
[40] Victor Le Pochat, Tom Van Goethem, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, Maciej Ko-
rczyński, and Wouter Joosen. 2019. Tranco: A Research-Oriented Top Sites
Ranking Hardened Against Manipulation. In NDSS’19.
[41] Linux man page. 2019. clamd.conf(5).
[42] Giancarlo De Maio, Alexandros Kapravelos, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Christopher
Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. 2014. PExy: The Other Side of Exploit Kits. In
DIMVA’14. Egham, UK.
[43] Malekal. 2018. Liste Malware. http://malwaredb.malekal.com/index.php?
malware=wajam.
[44] Mandiant. 2013. APT1 – Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage
Units. https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/
mandiant-apt1-report.pdf.
[45] Thiago Marques. 2016. PNG Embedded - Malicious payload hidden in a PNG
file. Kaspersky Labs blog article (Mar. 24, 2016). https://securelist.com/png-
embedded-malicious-payload-hidden-in-a-png-file/74297/.
[46] Paul McFedries. 2005. Technically speaking: the spyware nightmare. IEEE
Spectrum 42, 8 (2005), 72–72.
[47] Antonio Nappa, M Zubair Rafique, and Juan Caballero. 2013. Driving in the cloud:
An analysis of drive-by download operations and abuse reporting. In DIMVA’2013.
Berlin, Germany.
[48] NSIS Wiki. 2019. Can I decompile an existing installer? http://nsis.sourceforge.
net/Can_I_decompile_an_existing_installer.
[49] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. 2017. Canadian adware developer
Wajam Internet Technologies Inc. breaches multiple provisions of PIPEDA. Tech-
nical Report #2017-002. https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/
investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2017/pipeda-2017-002/.
[50] PreEmptive Solutions. 2019. Dotfuscator | .NET Obfuscator & Much More. https:
//www.preemptive.com/products/dotfuscator/overview.
[51] Progress Software. 2019. What is Telerik FiddlerCore? https://www.telerik.com/
fiddler/fiddlercore.
[52] Quebec Government. 2015. Registraire des entreprises. http://www.
registreentreprises.gouv.qc.ca.
[53] Babak Bashari Rad, Maslin Masrom, and Suhaimi Ibrahim. 2012. Camouflage in
malware: from encryption to metamorphism. International Journal of Computer
Science and Network Security 12, 8 (2012), 74–83.
[54] Reporters Without Borders. 2014. Enemies of the Internet 2014: entities at the
heart of censorship and surveillance. Report (Mar. 11, 2014). https://web.archive.
org/web/20171110033534/http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/.
[55] E. Rescorla and RTFM, Inc. 2000. RFC 2818: HTTP Over TLS. RFC 2818
(Informational Track).
[56] Eric Roman. 2017. Chrome no longer accepts certificates that fallback to common
name. Chromium issue 700595 (Mar. 11, 2017). https://bugs.chromium.org/p/
chromium/issues/detail?id=700595&desc=2.
[57] Mike Schiffman. 2010. A Brief History of Malware Obfuscation: Part 2 of 2. Cisco
blog article (Fev. 22, 2010). https://blogs.cisco.com/security/a_brief_history_of_
malware_obfuscation_part_2_of_2.
[58] Saumil Shah and Dave Cole. 2015. Spyware/Adware – The Quest for Consumer
Desktops & How it Went Wrong. In BlackHat’05 Japan. Tokyo, Japan.
[59] Chris Sharp. 2014. Add wajam_goblin.dll and wajam_goblin_64.dll to
Chrome’s blacklist. https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/
8d53428549c4cdf3e335e92041b1541d2ee4f065.
[60] Seungwon Shin and Guofei Gu. 2010. Conficker and beyond: a large-scale empir-
ical study. In ACSAC’10. Austin, TX, USA.
[61] Vitaly Sidorov. 2019. Network filtering toolkit. http://netfiltersdk.com/.
[62] Vitaly Sidorov. 2019. ProtocolFilters history. http://netfiltersdk.com/
protocolfilters_history.html.
[63] Aditya K. Sood and Rohit Bansal. 2014. Prosecting the Citadel botnet - revealing
the dominance of the Zeus descendent. White paper (Sep. 8 2014). https:
//www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2014/vb201409-Citadel.pdf.
[64] Paul Soucy. 2015. Wajam. Blog post (Aug. 21, 2015). http://dev-smart.com/wajam/.
[65] SourceForge.net. 2018. NSIS Download Statistics. https://sourceforge.net/
projects/nsis/files/NSIS%203/stats/timeline.
[66] Eugene H. Spafford. 1989. The Internet Worm Program: An Analysis. SIGCOMM
Comput. Commun. Rev. 19, 1 (Jan. 1989), 17–57.
[67] Tom Spring. 2017. Where Have All The Exploit Kits Gone? News article (Mar.
15, 2017). https://threatpost.com/where-have-all-the-exploit-kits-gone/124241/.
[68] Brett Stone-Gross, Marco Cova, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Bob Gilbert, Martin Szyd-
lowski, Richard A. Kemmerer, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. 2009.
Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover. In CCS’09. Chicago, IL,
USA.
[69] Symantec. 2011. W32.Stuxnet Dossier. White paper (Feb.
2011). https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_
response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf.
[70] Symantec. 2018. Internet Security Threat Report Volume 23. https:
//www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/istr-23-cyber-security-threat-
landscape.
[71] Amir Szekely. 2019. NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System). http://nsis.
sourceforge.net/Main_Page.
[72] Ben Tedesco. 2016. Security Advisory: Adware Uses Advanced Nation-State
Obfuscation Techniques to Deliver Ransomware. Carbon Black blog article (Sep.
23, 2016). https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-
well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-
techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/.
[73] TheGuardian.com. 2007. In millions of Windows, the perfect Storm is gathering.
News article (Oct. 21, 2007). https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/oct/21/
1.
[74] Kurt Thomas, Elie Bursztein, Chris Grier, Grant Ho, Nav Jagpal, Alexandros
Kapravelos, Damon McCoy, Antonio Nappa, Vern Paxson, Paul Pearce, Niels
Provos, and Moheeb Abu Rajab. 2015. Ad Injection at Scale: Assessing Deceptive
Advertisement Modifications. In IEEE S&P. San Jose, CA, USA.
[75] Kurt Thomas, Juan A. Elices Crespo, Ryan Rasti, Jean-Michel Picod, Cait
Phillips, Marc-André Decoste, Chris Sharp, Fabio Tirelo, Ali Tofigh, Marc-Antoine
Courteau, Lucas Ballard, Robert Shield, Nav Jagpal, Moheeb Abu Rajab, Panayiotis
Mavrommatis, Niels Provos, Elie Bursztein, and Damon McCoy. 2016. Investigat-
ing Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software. In
USENIX Security Symposium. Austin, TX, USA.
[76] Wing Wong and Mark Stamp. 2006. Hunting for metamorphic engines. Journal
in Computer Virology 2, 3 (2006), 211–229.
[77] WordPress. 2019. A live look at activity acrossWordPress.com. https://wordpress.
com/activity/.
[78] x64dbg. 2019. An open-source x64/x32 debugger for windows. https://x64dbg.
com/.
A ANTI-ANALYSIS AND EVASION DETAILS
Decrypting payloads. Steganography-based samples D14–18 pro-
tect the BRH, by XORing it with a random string found in a stub
DLL. Due to the challenges in understanding the decryption rou-
tine to find the key, we found that it is easier to brute-force the
decryption with all printable strings from that stub DLL until an
executable format is decrypted. Alternatively, since parts of the
PE headers are predictable, it is possible to recover this key us-
ing a known-plaintext attack. However, since D17, this attack is
no longer possible as the plaintext is further compressed using a
custom method for which there is no known fixed values.
Similarly, the goblin DLL is compressed and encrypted starting
from C6 using RC4 and a hardcoded 16-byte key. The key is located
in themain executable and can be found by extracting all strings and
trying them to decrypt the DLL until a valid GZip header appears.
Finally, a separate updater runs a Windows service that relies on
an encrypted payload called service.dat. In D11–15, the encryp-
tion also simply relies on a 16-byte XORed pattern; however, it is
not found as plaintext in the main or updater file. Instead, by XOR-
ing a known pattern from the PE header, we can recover the key.
To fix this weakness, samples starting from D16 switched to RC4,
forcing the search of the key obfuscated in one of the executables.
T2: Changing static resources. Early versions of Wajam shared
the same icon on their installers. The icon is later changed between
variants at few random pixel locations. The color of these pixels is
slightly altered to give a new icon while remaining visibly identical,
see Figure 7. As a result, the hash of the resource section varies,
preventing easy resource fingerprinting. Starting from D11, Wajam
pick random icons from third party icon libraries for both the
installer and installed binaries. An illustration is given in Figure 8.
∩ =
Figure 7: Icon polymorphism with slight pixel alteration
T3: Nested executables. FromC8,Wajam’smain installer unpacks
and runs a second NSIS-based installer.
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Table 4: Samples summary (N/A means not applicable, e.g., expired downloader samples do not install an application)
ID Installer/downloader/patch filename
Sig
ne
d
co
mp
on
en
t?
Date UTC Authenticode CN Installed name Au
toi
ns
tal
l
Op
en
s w
eb
pa
ge
Ste
alt
hy
Ro
otk
it
Origin
A1 wajam_install.exe ✓ 2013-01-03 Wajam Wajam ✓ Hybrid Analysis
A2 wajam_setup.exe ✓ 2014-01-09 Wajam Internet Technologies Inc Wajam Hybrid Analysis
A3 wajam_download.exe ✓ 2014-05-21 Insta-Download.com N/A N/A N/A N/A Malekal MalwareDB
A4 wajam_download_v2.exe ✓ 2014-07-11 Insta-Download.com N/A N/A N/A N/A Malekal MalwareDB
B1 WIE_2.15.2.5.exe ✓ 2014-09-25 FastFreeInstall.com Wajam ✓ Malekal MalwareDB
B2 WIE_2.16.1.90.exe ✓ 2014-10-03 FastFreeInstall.com Wajam ✓ Malekal MalwareDB
C1 WWE_1.1.0.48.exe ✓ 2014-10-21 AutoDownload.net Wajam ✓ VirusShare
C2 WWE_1.1.0.51.exe ✓ 2014-11-05 AutoDownload.net Wajam ✓ VirusShare
C3 WWE_1.2.0.31.exe ✓ 2014-12-03 AutoDownload.net Wajam ✓ VirusShare
B3 wajam_setup.exe ✓ 2014-12-09 Wajam Internet Technologies Inc Wajam ✓ Archive.org
C4 WWE_1.2.0.53.exe ✓ 2015-01-21 AutoDownload.net Wajam ✓ VirusShare
C5 wwe_1.43.5.6.exe ✓ 2015-04-13 installation-sur-iphone.com Wajam ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C6 WWE_1.52.5.3.exe ✓ 2015-09-17 chabaneltechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C7 WWE_1.53.5.19.exe ✓ 2015-10-16 trudeautechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
B4 WIE_2.38.2.13.exe 2015-10-27 N/A Wajam ✓ Malekal MalwareDB
B5 wie_2.39.2.11.exe 2015-11-05 N/A Wajam ✓ Malekal MalwareDB
C8 wajam_install.exe ✓ 2015-11-13 preverttechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Malekal MalwareDB
C9 WWE_1.55.1.20.exe ✓ 2015-11-16 preverttechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C10 WWE_1.58.101.25.exe ✓ 2016-01-04 yvonlheureuxtechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
B6 WIE_2.40.10.5.exe 2016-01-19 N/A Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C11 WWE_1.61.80.6.exe ✓ 2016-02-23 saintdominiquetechnology.com (nothing) ✓ ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C12 WWE_1.61.80.8.exe ✓ 2016-02-24 saintdominiquetechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C13 WWE_1.63.101.27.exe ✓ 2016-03-25 carmenbienvenuetechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C14 WWE_1.64.105.3.exe ✓ 2016-04-07 Telecharger-Installer.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D1 WBE_0.1.156.12.exe ✓ 2016-04-11 technologieadrienprovencher.com Wajam ✓ ✓ VirusShare
C15 WWE_1.65.101.8.exe ✓ 2016-04-14 sirwilfridlauriertechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ VirusShare
D2 wbe_0.1.156.16.exe ✓ 2016-04-21 technologieadrienprovencher.com Wajam ✓ ✓ VirusShare
C16 WWE_1.65.101.21.exe ✓ 2016-04-21 sirwilfridlauriertechnology.com Wajam ✓ ✓ VirusShare
D3 WBE_3.5.101.4.exe ✓ 2016-04-28 technologieadrienprovencher.com Wajam ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C17 wwe_9.66.101.9.exe ✓ 2016-05-09 sirwilfridlauriertechnology.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ ✓ VirusShare
D4 WBE_11.8.1.26.exe ✓ 2016-08-29 technologieferronnerie.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C18 patch_1.68.15.18.zip ✓ 2016-10-18 beaubourgtechnology.com N/A N/A N/A N/A ✓ wajam-download.com
D5 WBE_crypted_bundle_11.12.1.100
.release.exe
✓ 2016-11-22 emersontechnology.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D6 WBE_crypted_bundle_11.12.1.301
.release.exe
✓ 2017-01-30 wottontechnology.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Malekal MalwareDB
D7 WBE_crypted_bundle_11.12.1.310
.release.exe
✓ 2017-02-03 piddingtontechnology.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D8 WBE_crypted_bundle_11.12.1.334
.release.exe
✓ 2017-02-10 quaintontechnology.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D9 WBE_crypted_bundle_11.13.1.52
.release.exe
✓ 2017-03-21 wendleburytechnology.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
C19 patch_1.77.10.1.zip 2017-04-01 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A wajam-download.com
D10 WBE_crypted_bundle_11.13.1.88
.release.exe
✓ 2017-04-13 technologieflagstick.com Social2Search ✓ ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D11 Setup.exe ✓ 2017-07-11 terussetechnology.com Social2Search ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D12 Setup.exe ✓ 2017-08-25 vanoisetechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D13 Setup.exe ✓ 2017-09-18 technologievanoise.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D14 s2s_install.exe ✓ 2017-11-27 boisseleautechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D15 update.exe ✓ 2017-12-25 barachoistechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D16 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-01-02 technologienouaillac.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D17 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-02-12 pillactechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D18 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-02-19 pillactechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ Hybrid Analysis
D19 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-03-05 technologiepillac.com SearchAwesome ✓ mileendsoft.com
D20 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-04-18 monestiertechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ technologiesnowdon.com
D21 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-05-30 bombarderietechnology.com SearchAwesome ✓ technologiesnowdon.com
D22 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-06-12 technologiebombarderie.com SearchAwesome ✓ technologiesnowdon.com
D23 Setup.exe ✓ 2018-07-16 technologievouillon.com SearchAwesome ✓ technologiesnowdon.com
Legend: The “Filename” is the most descriptive name we found from either the source where we found the sample, HA [22] or VirusTotal. “Signed component” indicates
whether the installer or a component it installs is authenticode-signed, in which case the Date column refers to the authenticode signature date, otherwise it shows the latest
file timestamp among all installed files. “Authenticode CN” reflects the corresponding Common Name on the signing certificate. “Installed name” refers to the name of the
application that appears in the list of installed programs on Windows. “Autoinstall” reflects the ability of the installer to automatically proceed with the installation without
user interaction (beyond launching the executable and agreeing to the UAC prompt), i.e., it does not require clicking a button first or giving consent. “Open webpage” indicates
whether a Wajam website is opened at the end of the installation (typically to congratulate the user). “Stealthy” indicates whether the installation process is totally transparent
to the user. It requires Autoinstall and not opening a webpage by the end of the setup, and also not showing any setup window. “Rootkit” indicates the ability to hide the
installed application folder from the user. Finally, “Origin” indicates the provenance of the sample.
T4: Payload compression and encryption. The nested installer
is encrypted starting from C10, with the key appended at the end
of the ciphertext. Similarly, the goblin DLL is compressed and en-
crypted starting from C6 using RC4 and a hardcoded 16-byte key.
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Table 5: List of 332 domains that appear to belong or have belonged to Wajam
4hewl9m5xz.xyz searchawesome-apps.com henaulttechnology.com technologieadrienprovencher.com technologiemonroe.com
4rfgtyr5erxz.com searchesandfind.com hutchisontechnology.com technologiearmandlamoureux.com technologiemontorgueil.com
94j7afz2nr.xyz searchfeedtech.com jarbontechnology.com technologiebarachois.com technologiemontroyal.com
9rtrigfijgu.com searchforall.net jeanlesagetechnology.com technologiebeaubourg.com technologiemontrozier.com
9ruey8ughjffo.xyz searchforfree.net jolicoeurtechnology.com technologiebeaumont.com technologiemounac.com
im1.xyz searchnewsroom.com kingswoodtechnology.com technologiebellechasse.com technologienouaillac.com
im2.xyz searchnotifications.com kingwintechnology.com technologiebeloeil.com technologienullarbor.com
ta14th1arkr1.xyz search-ology.com labroyetechnology.com technologiebernard.com technologieoutremont.com
wj1.xyz searchpage.com langeliertechnology.com technologieberri.com technologiepapineau.com
wj2.xyz searchpageresults.com laubeyrietechnology.com technologieboisseleau.com technologiepayenne.com
wj3.xyz searchpage-results.com launtontechnology.com technologieboissy.com technologiepeaches.com
wj4.xyz searchpage-results.net laurendeautechnology.com technologiebombarderie.com technologiepelletier.com
wj5.xyz searchsymphony.com lauriertechnology.com technologiebouloi.com technologiepiddington.com
autodownload.net searchtech.net mandartechnology.com technologiebourassa.com technologiepillac.com
autotelechargement.net securesearch.xyz manillertechnology.com technologieboussac.com technologieprevert.com
coolappinstaler.com seekoutresultz.com mansactechnology.com technologiebreck.com technologiequainton.com
customsearches.net social2search.com mercilletechnology.com technologiecalmont.com technologierachel.com
datawestsoftware.com socialwebsearch.co meridiertechnology.com technologiecarmenbienvenue.com technologierambuteau.com
dateandtimesync.com superdownloads.com mertontechnology.com technologiecartier.com technologierivolet.com
dkbsoftware.com supertelechargements.com monestiertechnology.com technologiechabanel.com technologieruso.com
download-flv.com vpn-free.mobi monroetechnology.com technologiechabot.com technologierutherford.com
download-install.com wajam.com montorgueiltechnology.com technologiechamoille.com technologiesagard.com
downloadmngr.com wajam-download.com montroziertechnology.com technologiechamplain.com technologiesaintdenis.com
downloadtryfree.com youcansearch.net mounactechnology.com technologiecharlevoix.com technologiesaintdominique.com
downlowd.com adrienprovenchertechnology.com nouaillactechnology.com technologiechaumont.com technologiesaintjoseph.com
downlowd.org armandlamoureuxtechnology.com nullarbortechnology.com technologiechavanac.com technologiesaintlaurent.com
fastappinstall.com barachoistechnology.com papineautechnology.com technologiecherrier.com technologiesainturbain.com
fastfreeinstall.com beaubourgtechnology.com payennetechnology.com technologiechesterton.com technologiesearchawesome.com
fastnfreedownload.com bellechassetechnology.com peachestechnology.com technologieclairavaux.com technologiesentier.com
fastnfreeinstall.com bernardtechnology.com pelletiertechnology.com technologiecoloniale.com technologiesherman.com
file-extract.com berritechnology.com piddingtontechnology.com technologiecormack.com technologiesirwilfridlaurier.com
fileextractor.net boisseleautechnology.com pillactechnology.com technologiecremazie.com technologiesnowdon.com
fileopens.com boissytechnology.com plateau-technologies.com technologiecubley.com technologiesommery.com
findresultz.com bombarderietechnology.com preverttechnology.com technologiedollard.com technologiestdenis.com
flvplayer-hd.com bouloitechnology.com quaintontechnology.com technologiedrapeau.com technologiestlaurent.com
freeappdownloader.com bourassatechnology.com racheltechnology.com technologieduluth.com technologiestuart.com
freeappinstall.com boussactechnology.com rambuteautechnology.com technologieemerson.com technologietazo.com
freeusip.mobi brecktechnology.com rivolettechnology.com technologieferronnerie.com technologieterusse.com
imt-dashboard.tech calmonttechnology.com sagardtechnology.com technologieflagstick.com technologiethorel.com
insta-download.com carmenbienvenuetechnology.com saintdominiquetechnology.com technologiefullum.com technologietofino.com
install-apps.com cartiertechnology.com saintjosephtechnology.com technologiefulmar.com technologietoleto.com
installappsfree.com chabaneltechnology.com sainturbaintechnology.com technologiefumier.com technologietourville.com
installateurdappscool.com chabottechnology.com search-technology.net technologiegarfield.com technologietravassac.com
installationdappgratuite.com chamoilletechnology.com sentiertechnology.com technologiegarnier.com technologietreeland.com
installationrapideetgratuite.com champlaintechnology.com shermantechnology.com technologieglencoe.com technologietrudeau.com
installationrapidegratuite.com charlevoixtechnology.com sirwilfridlauriertechnology.com technologiegoyer.com technologieturenne.com
installeriffic.com chaumonttechnology.com snowdontechnology.com technologiegrendon.com technologievanhorne.com
installerus.com chavanactechnology.com sommerytechnology.com technologiehenault.com technologievanoise.com
installsofttech.com cherriertechnology.com tazotechnology.com technologiehutchison.com technologievassy.com
ios-vpn.com chestertontechnology.com terussetechnology.com technologiejarbon.com technologieviau.com
main-social2search.netdna-ssl.com clairavauxtechnology.com thoreltechnology.com technologiejeanlesage.com technologievimy.com
media-c9hg3zwqygdshhtrps.stackpathdns.com colonialetechnology.com tofinotechnology.com technologiejolicoeur.com technologievouillon.com
mileendsoft.com cormacktechnology.com toletotechnology.com technologiekingswood.com technologiewendlebury.com
notification-results.com cremazietechnology.com tourvilletechnology.com technologiekingwin.com technologiewilson.com
notifications-page.com cubleytechnology.com travassactechnology.com technologielabroye.com technologiewiseman.com
notifications-service.info despinstechnology.com trudeautechnology.com technologielangelier.com technologiewoodham.com
notifications-service.io drapeautechnology.com turennetechnology.com technologielaubeyrie.com technologiewoodstream.com
pagerecherche.com emersontechnology.com vanhornetechnology.com technologielaunton.com technologiewotton.com
premiumsearchhub.com ferronnerietechnology.com vanoisetechnology.com technologielaurendeau.com technologieyvonlheureux.com
premiumsearchresults.com fullumtechnology.com vassytechnology.com technologielaurier.com technologyflagstick.com
premiumsearchtech.com fulmartechnology.com viautechnology.com technologiemandar.com technologyrutherford.com
result-spark.com fumiertechnology.com videos-conversion.com technologiemaniller.com technologytreeland.com
resultsstream.com garfieldtechnology.com vouillontechnology.com technologiemansac.com technologywilson.com
searchawesome.net garniertechnology.com wendleburytechnology.com technologiemercille.com technologywoodstream.com
search-awesome.net get-notifications.com woodhamtechnology.com technologiemeridier.com
searchawesome2.com glencoetechnology.com wottontechnology.com technologiemerton.com
searchawesome3.com grendontechnology.com yvonlheureuxtechnology.com technologiemonestier.com
From D11, the updater is also encrypted with a hardcoded XOR key,
then with RC4 in D16. The injection rules and updates fetched by
Wajam are also encrypted (see Section 10).
T7: Obfuscated key reconstruction. In D17–19, up to two keys
are combined and reconstructed from arbitrary string manipula-
tions over the key found in the ciphertext.
T8: Obfuscated installer script. The NSIS scripts, which can be
decompiled from installers, are obfuscated with thousands of vari-
ables and string manipulation operations. We could not find a de-
scription of such behavior in the literature. Note that techniques
to prevent the identification and recovery of NSIS installers are
not used [48]. Unlike the nested installer, the outer one remains
unobfuscated. This could be done to avoid simple heuristics.
T9: .NET and Powershell obfuscation. In the FiddlerCore gener-
ation, the Windows service is responsible for adjusting the browser
proxy settings and launching the FiddlerCore-based network proxy
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Figure 8: Icons used in the Wajam’s installers we collected
written in C#. Samples from 2014 are not obfuscated and the C#/.NET
components are decompilable. Starting from sample B4, the method
and variable names of C# components are randomized. The deobfus-
cator de4dot [4] detects that Dotfuscator [50] was used to obfuscate
the program; however, only generic method and variable names
were reconstructed. Also, de4dot does not remove obvious dead
code. Indeed, useful lines of code are interleaved with string decla-
rations made of concatenated random strings. Since such strings
are never used, except possibly in the declaration of other such
strings, they are easy to remove automatically.
The Powershell persistence module consists of a long encrypted
standard string, using a user-specific key. As the script runs with
SYSTEM privileges, only this account can successfully decrypt the
string, revealing another Powershell script that is then invoked.
Since decrypting such strings is not directly allowed, the script con-
verts the standard string to a SecureString, creates a PSCredential
object, and sets the SecureString as the password. Then, it obtains
the plaintext password from this object.
T10: Auto-whitelisting. From D5, the installer whitelists the in-
stalled program paths in Windows Defender. Wajam inserts the
paths of its main components under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\
Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths.
T11: Disabling MRT. From D12, the installer also disables the
monthly scans by Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool
(MRT) along with the reporting of any detected infections.
T13: String obfuscation and encryption. Since C1, string literals
in the installed binaries are all XORed with a per-string key.
T14: Dynamic API calls. External library calls are made dynam-
ically by calling the LoadLibrary API function provided with a
DLL name as argument (obfuscated with T13).
T16: Encrypted code. The main executable’s code section is en-
crypted in D5–10 with a custom algorithm based on several byte-
wise XOR and subtraction operations. Chunks of 456KiB are de-
coded with the same logic, while each chunk is decoded differently.
Such samples correlate with installers where the file name is pre-
fixed with “WBE_crypted_bundle_”, suggesting that the encryption
layer was added after compilation, possibly by a third-party toolkit.
T19: Randomized names. FromB4, installed executable filenames
appear random. The installation folder itself becomes randomized
from C14 and D3. The names are actually derived from the original
name (e.g., wajam.exe), combined with the Machine GUID obtained
from registry, and hashed, i.e., md5(GUID+filename).6 This pattern
6For instance, C:\Program Files\WaNetworkEn\wajam.exe be-
comes C:\Program Files\6
¯
86d944556d5de03afc6aa639bff9c7\
is also used in the common name of root certificates from the fourth
generation (see Appendix D).
T20: Rootkit. C11,17,18 rely on a kernel-mode driver to hide the
installation folder from the user space, effectively turning Wajam
into a rootkit. C11 also remains even more stealthy as it does not
register itself as an installed program and hence does not appear
in the list for users to uninstall it. The file system driver responsi-
ble for hiding Wajam’s files is called Lacuna and is either named
pcwtata.sys or similar, and is signed by DigiCert.
T21: Persistence module.Wajam establishes persistence through
executables or scripts that are left in the C:\Windows folder and not
removed by uninstalling the product. While executables could be
detected by antiviruses, Wajam leverages (obfuscated) Powershell
scripts in samples C17, D3 and D12–13. A scheduled task is left on
the system to trigger the persistence module at user logon. From
D14 onward, the persistence module is a regular executable, inherit-
ing some anti-analysis techniques previously mentioned, and set up
as a Windows service that starts at boot-time. The module checks
for the presence of the installation directory and main executable. If
they do not exist, the module follows the process of updating the ap-
plication by querying a hardcoded URL to download a fresh variant.
This behavior is mostly intended for reinstalling the application
after it has been uninstalled, or removed by an antivirus. However,
we found that the hardcoded URL is not updated throughout the
lifetime of the module on the system, and could be inaccessible
when necessary.
T22: Detection of installed antiviruses. In every sample since
C6, Wajam looks for the presence of a series of 22 major antiviruses
and other endpoint security software, then attaches the list of de-
tected products to almost every query it makes to Wajam’s server.
This might be used to evaluate the distribution of AVs among vic-
tims and tailor efforts to evade the most popular ones. Notably,
some of the listed products are intended for business use only, e.g.,
AhnLab and McAfee Endpoint, raising concerns that Wajam might
also targets enterprises specifically.
B UNIQUE IDS
Two unique identifiers are generated during installation, and writ-
ten in the Windows registry. All requests made to Wajam’s servers
include these identifiers. The first one, called unique_id or uid
is generated as the uppercased MD5 hash of the combination of:
1) the MAC address of the main network adapter, 2) the path for
the temporary folder for applications (which contains the user ac-
count’s name), and 3) the corresponding disk’s serial number. The
calculation of second identifier, machine_id or mid, appears to in-
tend including the Machine GUID; however, a programming error
fails to achieve this goal, and instead includes some artifact of the
string operations performed on the MAC address. In our case, the
mid was simply the MAC address prepended by a “1”. This issue
was never fixed.
06ca8c13762fca02c5dae8e502fd91c9.exe, with the folder name correspond-
ing to md5(MachineGUID+‘WaNetworkEn’) and the filename taken from
md5(MachineGUID+‘wajam.exe’).
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[hooks]
[chrome]
[...]
[66_0_3353_2]
[32bits]
[PR_Close] => 0x0181C296
[PR_Write_App] => 0x01824532
[SSL_read_impl] => 0x01817684
[64bits]
[PR_Close] => 0x02318A7C
[PR_Read] => 0x02312A0C
[PR_Write] => 0x0232307C
[PR_Write_App] => 0x0232307C
[SSL_read_impl] => 0x02312A0C
Figure 9: Browser injection rule for Chrome 66.0.3353.2
C UPDATES AND INJECTIONS
Program updates are found in an update or manifest file, generally
located at /webenhancer/update, /browserenhancer/update
or /proxy/manifest on the remote server. Similarly, traf-
fic injection rules are called injections or mapping (lo-
cated at /addon/mapping or /webenhancer/injections). Fi-
nally, the third generation specifically retrieves a config file
(/webenhancer/config).
Bootstrap and cache. The first update is fetched from a hardcoded
URL. Later updates are made based on the “update_url” parameter
found in the previously fetched file. Once the injection rules are
downloaded, they are stored in the program’s folder in plaintext
in a file named WJManifest for early samples (i.e., B2 and earlier),
or encrypted as is in a file named waaaghs or its obfuscated name.
Browser hooking rules are cached similarly, under a file named
snotlings or its obfuscated version.
Injection methods. The third generation of Wajam injects a DLL
into browser processes, which further hooks a number of functions
to manipulate the traffic. While the offsets of the functions are
available in the hourly update for Chromium-based browsers, IE and
Firefox do not require additional information since the functions
to be hooked are readily exported by wininet.dll (in the case of
IE) and nss3.dll (for Firefox), and hence can be found easily at
runtime. Given the names corresponding to the addresses found in
this update file, e.g., PR_Write, SSL_read_impl, Wajam seems to
follow the same function hooking strategy to inject content in the
network traffic as the Citadel malware [63].
Wajam avoids intercepting non-browser applications as evident
from a blacklistlist of process names in the update file, e.g., drop-
box.exe, skype.exe, bittorrent.exe. Additionally, a whitelist is also
present, including the name of supported browser processes; how-
ever, it appears not to be used.
Furthermore, Wajam seems to have had difficulties handling
certain protocols and compression algorithms in the past. It disables
SPDY in Firefox. Before Chrome version 46, Wajam also modifies
the value located at a given offset that represents whether SPDY is
enabled to disable this feature. Similarly, the SDCH compression
algorithm is disabled. The number of functions to be hooked evolves
from one version of the browser to another, with a different set for
32 and 64-bit versions, sometimes including only PR_(Read, Write,
Write_App, SetError, Close), or also SSL_read_impl.
D ROOT CERTIFICATE FINGERPRINTS
Common Name generation. Recovering this algorithm is not
straightforward as several intermediate functions separate the CN
generation from the certificate generation. We first identify the
function in charge of retrieving the Machine GUID from the reg-
istry, and label the parent responsible for concatenating a given
string to it and applying the MD5 hash. Then, we identify the func-
tion that writes the certificate to a file named after the CN, and trace
the origin of the filename to a function that calls the previously
labeled function. The argument passed in the call corresponds to
the concatenated string. After observing in a few samples that the
concatenated string matches the registry key of the installed appli-
cation, we simply proceed to try this key to match the generated
certificates in other samples. The various application names can be
found in Table 3.
In the last two samples (D22–23), the process is similar; how-
ever, only the 12 first hexadecimal characters of the MD5 hash are
taken into account, which are further encoded using base64 giving
e.g., ZmJiYmRiODYxNTZi. We also found that samples branded as
SearchAwesome install a certificate with a CN appended with the
digit “2”, corresponding to a new feature in ProtocolFilters that
appeared in May 2015 [62].
Fingerprints. Table 6 shows the regular expressions to match Wa-
jam’s 2nd and 4th generation root certificate Distinguished Names
(DN) based on our observations.
While the first 3 DNs are static, others capture all possible com-
binations which we reverse-engineered from Wajam’s binaries. In
particular, patterns 4–5 match a CN that represents 16 hexadecimal
characters, thus this type of CN caries log2(1616) = 64 bits of en-
tropy. Patterns 6–9 correspond to samples where the hexadecimal
CN is base64-encoded and truncated at various lengths. Due to the
limited space of hexadecimal characters to encode, the resulting
CN follows a repeated pattern of 4 letters from different sets, e.g.,
the first encoded letter can only be an Y, Z, M, N or O. Not all com-
binations of letters from the sets are possible, thus these patterns
are overestimating possible fingerprints. Pattern 6 can match up to
16 characters, which translates into 12 hexadecimal characters and
thus 48 bits of entropy.
During our scans in Mar. 2019, we also found certificates with
similar fingerprints as produced by D22 and D23; however, their
issuer CN were shorter. When we detected such cases, we also
fetched the web page and found that the injected content also points
to Wajam domains. Since samples from Mar. 2019 we could obtain
from the known distribution URL do not generate such certificates,
it could be possible that we are missing another “branch” of Wajam.
For instance, the shortened CN “MDM5Z 2” caries 12 bits for the
first four letters + 2.32 bits for the 5th character (one out of five),
resulting in an overall entropy of 14.32 bits.
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Table 6: Fingerprints for Wajam-issued leaf certificates (SQL regular expression syntax)
# Matches
samples
Operator Issuer Distinguished Name
1 B1–B3 = emailAddress=info@wajam.com, OU=Created by http://www.wajam.com, O=WajamInternetEnhancer, CN=Wajam_root_cer
2 B4–B5 = emailAddress=info@technologiesainturbain.com, OU=Created by http://www.technologiesainturbain.com, O=WajamInternetEnhancer, CN=WNetEnhancer_root_cer
3 B6 = emailAddress=info@technologievanhorne.com, OU=Created by http://www.technologievanhorne.com, O=WajamInternetEnhancer, CN=WaNetworkEnhancer_root_cer
4 D1–D10 REGEXP ^emailAddress=info@technologie.+\.com, C=EN, CN=[0-9a-f]{16}$
5 D11–D21 REGEXP ^C=EN, CN=[0-9a-f]{16} 2$
6 From D22 REGEXP ^C=EN, CN=([YZMNO][WTmj2zGD][FEJINMRQVUZYBAdchglk][h-mw-z0-5]){2,4} 2$
7 More recent REGEXP ^C=EN, CN=([YZMNO][WTmj2zGD][FEJINMRQVUZYBAdchglk][h-mw-z0-5]){1,3}[YZMNO][WTmj2zGD][FEJINMRQVUZYBAdchglk] 2$
8 More recent REGEXP ^C=EN, CN=([YZMNO][WTmj2zGD][FEJINMRQVUZYBAdchglk][h-mw-z0-5]){1,3}[YZMNO][WTmj2zGD] 2$
9 More recent REGEXP ^C=EN, CN=([YZMNO][WTmj2zGD][FEJINMRQVUZYBAdchglk][h-mw-z0-5]){1,3}[YZMNO] 2$
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